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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAVID J. OLSEN, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ] 
vs. 
MARILYN JOYCE OLSEN, aka ] 
MARILYN JOYCE PERKINS, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
I Case No. 890676-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the 
above-entitled Court by provision of Section 78-2a-3(2) (h), U.C.A., 
1953 as amended. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff appeals from the order and judgment of the 
Fifth District Court finding him in contempt and declaring that the 
assets of a certain closely-held corporation were subject to 
execution in the enforcement of a judgment rendered against 
Plaintiff for child support arrearages. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was the "alter-ego" issue properly before the lower 
court? 
2. Is the judgment, to the extent it purports to effect 
the assets of the closely-held corporation, void as against said 
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corporation? 
3. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the finding 
that the closely-held corporation is in fact Plaintiff's alter-ego? 
4. Are the findings, taken as a whole, sufficient to 
support the judgment of contempt? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The determination of this appeal does not require the 
construction of the language of any constitutional provision, 
statute or rule. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced April 24, 1987, in 
bifurcated proceedings which reserved the issues of child support 
and the division of property for trial at a later date (R. 77-83). 
Prior to the divorce Plaintiff had been engaged in the 
insurance business in St. George for approximately 15 years and, 
through a corporation known as David J. Olsen & Associates, Inc., 
had built up Ma good insurance agency and a good business" (T. 7). 
About six months after the entry of the decree dissolving the 
marriage relationship, David J. Olsen & Associates contracted to 
sell the insurance agency to one Robert MacLachlan (T. 7). 
During the period intervening between the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce and the trial on the issues of child support and 
division of property, both Plaintiff and Defendant remarried (R. 
82). 
Trial on the issues of child support and division of 
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property commenced on June 1, 1988, and concluded with a 
stipulation on June 3f 1988 (R. 54-66, 77-83). Under the terms of 
the stipulated decree, Plaintiff was awarded all the stock in David 
J. Olsen & Associates, Inc., and was ordered to pay child support 
in the amount of $190.00 per month, per child (R. 77-83). 
MacLachlan failed to make the payment which fell due in 
May 1988 and never made any further payment under the contract for 
the purchase of the insurance agency (T. 7-8). 
Litigation against MacLachlan was initiated in July 1988 
and in mid-1989, David J. Olsen & Associates was awarded judgment 
against MacLachlan in the amount of approximately $455,000.x The 
judgment is uncollectable (T. 8). In the course of the litigation 
Plaintiff expended approximately $40,000 to $50,000 in attorney's 
fees and costs in the attempt to enforce the contractual obligation 
or recover the agency (T. 8). 
Plaintiff immediately fell into default in the 
performance of his child support obligations (R. 103-105; T. 8-9). 
During the months of October and November 1988, Plaintiff 
remained hopeful that he would be able to regain possession and 
control of the insurance agency which, at that time, Plaintiff 
believed MacLachlan was still operating. Subsequent events would 
establish that although the doors were open, MacLachlan was in fact 
"out of business" and in January or February 1989 MacLachlan fired 
all of his employees and closed the doors (R. 9-10). 
1This case was styled David J. Olsen & Associates/ Inc., v. Great Basin 
Insurance Brokers, Inc., and Robert MacLachlan et al.. Third Judicial District, 
Salt Lake County, Civil No. C88-05346. 
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Plaintiff and his present wife then concluded, after 
examining all of their options, that it would be best for them in 
the short run and in the long run to go back into the insurance 
business and to attempt to form an agency in Salt Lake County 
(T.10) . 
In April 1989, Defendant's counsel withdrew and in June, 
Defendant initiated the proceedings which precipitated this appeal, 
pro se (R. 198-207) . 
Although the court's order and the proof of service 
apparently never made their way into the court's file, it appears 
that the Plaintiff was required to appear before the Domestic 
Commissioner on July 26, 1989 and show cause why judgment should 
not be entered against him for child support arrearages and why he 
should not be punished for contempt (R. 208). Plaintiff appeared 
by and through his former counsel but, as the result of 
difficulties his present wife was experiencing with her pregnancy, 
Plaintiff failed to appear in person. 
At that hearing counsel conceded that Defendant's 
calculation of the arrearage was correct and did not object to the 
entry of judgment. Counsel then requested that the issue of 
contempt be continued. The Commissioner continued the matter to 
August 9, 1989, and ordered that Plaintiff be present and provide 
the affidavit of his wife's physician excusing his absence from the 
July 26 hearing (R. 208). 
Plaintiff appeared with counsel on August 9 and the 
subject hearing ensued. 
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Counsel stipulated to the entry of judgment for the child 
support arrearages requested and the Commissioner identified the 
only issues before the court as contempt for failure to pay support 
as required by the decree and contempt for failure to appear on 
July 26 (T. 3). Counsel advised the Commissioner that Plaintiff 
was not prepared to provide the physician's affidavit conceding 
that counsel had failed to contact Plaintiff and advise him of the 
necessity of providing such an affidavit. Counsel then asked the 
Commissioner to allow Plaintiff to file the affidavit on or before 
August 15 (T. 4-5). The Commissioner then stated that if the 
affidavit were not filed with the court by August 15 the 
Commissioner would recommend that the Plaintiff be punished for 
contempt (T. 5).2 
The Commissioner then took testimony regarding the issue 
of the Plaintiff's contempt for failure to pay support as required 
by the orders of the court. Plaintiff commenced by outlining the 
unanticipated difficulties which he had experienced with respect to 
the sale of the St. George insurance agency and his attempt to 
establish a new agency in Salt Lake County (R. 7-10). 
Plaintiff testified that as a result of these 
unanticipated difficulties the only income he could count on on a 
monthly basis was "roughly between $800.00 and $1,000.00 per month" 
(T. 11). 
2The Affidavit of Dr. E. K. Rasmussen dated and sworn on August 10/ 1989, 
was not filed with the Court until August 22, 1989, following the entry of the 
Commissioner's Memorandum Decision which was date stamped earlier the same day 
(R. 216-224). 
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Plaintiff testified that the business of the new agency 
was beginning to pick up but that it would probably be at least a 
year before it would generate "a decent income or anything that 
I've been used to in the past of getting" (T. 11-12, 14). 
Plaintiff testified that he had provided $1,000 in 
support during the preceding three months and that he was prepared 
to pay another $150 on the date of the hearing (T. 13). 
During cross-examination of the Plaintiff, the 
Commissioner asked the Defendant to describe "how this DJO and 
Associates worked when you were married" (T. 39). Defendant 
responded by saying that DJO and Associates was just a "front," 
"just a way of getting the cars for everybody" (T. 39). The 
Defendant stated under further questioning by the Commissioner that 
David J. Olsen & Associates had several employees, including one 
Gary Jackson and Jackson's brother-in-law. "There were three or 
four salesman there" (T. 39). 
Plaintiff's former counsel then questioned the Defendant 
during cross-examination of the Plaintiff: 
MR. SNOW: Getting back to DJO, it's my 
understanding that DJO was an operating corporation 
that was involved in both the insurance business 
and I guess in the photo — photo processing 
business? 
MS. PERKINS: Right. 
MR. SNOW: But --
MS. PERKINS: All of David's business dealings were 
done through DJO & Associates. 
MR. SNOW: Okay. And that was while he was in St. 
George here; isn't that right? 
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MS. PERKINS: It was while we were married. 
MR. SNOW: Okay. While you were married. But what 
I — the point I'm making is they were actually 
operating business entities that included other 
people other than David Olsen; isn't that correct? 
MS. PERKINS: I believe so. David was the only one 
that could draw the money from — from DJO & 
Associates. He was the one that signed all the 
checks; he was the one that was the overseer of it 
all. 
MR SNOW: But what I'm saying is the only monies 
that came out of DJO didn't just solely go to 
automobiles, but they also paid other people's 
salaries like Gary Jackson; isn't that correct? 
MS. PERKINS: I don't know. I — I wasn't aware of 
it. All I know is that I was the vice president or 
something on that, and it was just a front. 
What I understand is that a corporation is supposed 
to hold business meetings regularly. There was no 
business meeting ever held. It was — it was a 
front is all it was — it was and ever will be. 
Just the way that — it's supposed — the way he 
explained it to me when we first got it started was 
that it would — it — I don't see that it's — 
(T. 42-44) 
On r e d i r e c t examination P l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d that David J. 
Olsen & Assoc iates was in fac t a funded corporation and various 
bus inesses were conducted through t h i s corporate form including 
Olsen-Jackson Insurance Agency and J i f f y Photo (T. 44 -45) . 
During the course of the hearing, P l a i n t i f f was 
questioned about DKO Insurance Agency.3 This evidence can be 
f a i r l y summarized as f o l l o w s : 
3DKO Investments, I n c . , i s a Utah corporation which does business as DKO 
Insurance Agency. The testimony at the August 9 hearing referred to the 
corporation by i t s assumed name. That manner of reference i s continued in t h i s 
br ie f for the sake of c l a r i t y . 
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1. DKO Insurance Agency is a corporation whose principal 
officers include Plaintiff's present wife, president; his brother-
in-law, Gordon Denison, vice-president; and Plaintiff who acts as 
secretary/treasurer (T. 40). 
2. DKO Insurance Agency has been capitalized by means of 
loans made to Plaintiff or his present wifef the proceeds of which 
have been placed in the corporation (T. 45-46). 
3. DKO Insurance Agency is the entity through which the 
Plaintiff is attempting to establish a new insurance agency in Salt 
Lake County (T. 31). 
4. This corporation employs Plaintiff's present wife and 
her salary is established at $2,600.00 per month, however she does 
not always draw that amount because there are not always sufficient 
funds available to pay her salary. The funds that have been paid 
her thus far are in fact loan proceeds (T. 22-23, 30-31, 46). 
5. DKO Insurance Agency owns a 1986 Chevrolet Camero and 
a 1988 Chevrolet pickup truck of which Plaintiff and his present 
wife have possession and use (T. 32). 
6. Plaintiff draws no salary from DKO Insurance Agency 
and his compensation in the insurance business is generated 
strictly through the earning and payment of commissions (T. 23). 
Following the hearing, the Commissioner found that the 
Plaintiff had been "voluntarily unemployed" and David J. Olsen & 
Associates was maintained as a "holding" corporation "for receipt 
of funds and disbursal of same for family necessities and living 
expenses such as automobiles, boats, airplanes and motorhomes" (R. 
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219) . The Commissioner concluded that DKO Insurance Agency was the 
Plaintiff's alter ego established to "insulate Plaintiff's assets 
from creditors, including Defendant's claim for past, present and 
future child support and to provide Plaintiff with a secure and 
comfortable lifestyle while he maintains that he has no income." * 
* * "Defendant's husband has recourse against Plaintiff and or his 
corporation for monies expended by him for support of Plaintiff's 
children" (R. 221). 
The Commissioner's Memorandum Decision was filed on 
August 22 and Plaintiff's counsel withdrew on August 23 (R. 216-
222f 225-226). 
On September 18 the Commissioner signed an order 
adjudging the Plaintiff guilty of contempt for failure to provide 
support and for failure to appear at the July 26 hearing. The 
Order further declares: 
3. The income of Plaintiff's current spouse is 
money available to Plaintiff to support his 
children. The Defendant's husband is entitled to 
recourse against Plaintiff and/or his corporation 
for monies expended by Defendant's husband for the 
support of Plaintiff's children. 
• * * 
5. The assets of DKO Insurance Company, Inc., and 
alter ego of Plaintiff established to insulate his 
assets from creditors, including Defendant's claim 
for past, present and future child support, are 
hereby ordered subject to action by Defendant to 
satisfy outstanding judgments she has or may have 
against the Plaintiff. The Defendant may execute 
against the assets of said corporation directly in 
order to collect Judgments she has or may have 
against Plaintiff. 
T. 233-234. 
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On September 27, 1989, Plaintiff's present counsel filed 
his appearance and, on the same day, filed written objections to 
the Commissioner's findings together with a motion for a new trial 
(R. 235-241)• 
On October 11f 1989, the district court overruled the 
objections as untimely, not having been filed within 10 days of the 
filing of the Commissioner's Memorandum Decision, and denied the 
motion for new trial (R. 244). This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At the outset of the hearing, the issues were narrowly 
defined and did not include a question of whether or not DKO 
Insurance Company was in fact Plaintiff's alter ego. The 
conclusion that the corporation was Plaintiff's alter ego is 
unsupported by the evidence. The judgment entered pursuant to 
those conclusions is not binding upon DKO Insurance Agency because 
it is not a party to these proceedings. 
Finally, the evidence, taken as a whole, does not support 
the judgment of contempt. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE "ALTER EGO" ISSUE WAS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE 
DOMESTIC COMMISSIONER. 
At the outset of the hearing the matter at issue was 
narrowly defined as one of contempt for the Plaintiff's alleged 
willful failure to provide support for his children. While under 
Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, issues not raised by the 
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pleadings may be tried by the express or implied consent of the 
parties, it is apparent from the record that the "alter egoM issue 
was raised principally as the result of questions exchanged between 
the Commissioner and the Defendant while the Defendant was "cross-
examining" the Plaintiff. 
The test for determining whether the pleadings should be 
deemed amended under Rule 15(b) is "whether the opposing party had 
a fair opportunity to defend and whether it could offer additional 
evidence if the case were retried on a different theory." R. A. 
Pohl Const. Co. v. Marshall, 640 F.2d 266 267 (10th Cir.1981). 
Clearly, had Plaintiff been aware that the viability and 
bona fides of David J. Olsen & Associates and DKO Insurance Agency 
were issues in this proceeding, Plaintiff's position in defending 
the allegations of alter ego would have been significantly 
enhanced. As it was, Plaintiff was left to defend against 
conclusory allegations without the availability of a single 
corporate document or record to assist him. 
POINT II 
THE JUDGMENT IS VOID AS AGAINST DKO INSURANCE 
AGENCY. 
The judgment of the district court purports to give the 
Defendant and her present husband authority to execute any judgment 
against the Plaintiff by seizing and selling assets belonging to 
DKO Insurance Agency. DKO Insurance Agency is a separate and 
distinct legal entity. Neither the corporation nor its 
shareholders were made parties to these proceedings. 
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In the typical case, the "alter ego" doctrine is used to 
get through the corporation and reach assets of the shareholders. 
In such a situationf the liability of the individual stockholder is 
never determined in a proceeding in which only the corporation is 
named as a party. The corporate entity and the shareholder sought 
to be charged are both joined and afforded an opportunity to 
defend. 
The instant case takes somewhat of a back door approach 
rendering a judgment which purports to bind upon the corporation 
which is not even a party to the proceedings. Clearly this 
judgment cannot bind the corporation without resulting in the 
denial of due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, 
Section 7, of the Constitution of Utah. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE 
COMMISSIONER'S FINDING THAT DKO INSURANCE AGENCY IS 
IN FACT THE PLAINTIFF'S ALTER EGO. 
Ordinarily a corporation is viewed as a legal entity 
distinct from its shareholders. Under the equitable "alter ego" 
doctrine, courts have, upon a proper showing, disregarded the 
integrity of the corporation and viewed a controlling shareholder 
as indistinguishable from the corporation, permitting creditors of 
the corporation to reach assets of the controlling shareholder. 
See Dockstader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 370, 510 P.2d 526 (1973). In 
certain instances, the doctrine has been applied to permit 
creditors of the individual stockholder to reach assets of the 
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corporation where the requirements of the doctrine are satisfied. 
See Transamerica Cash Reserve v. Dixie Power and Water, 129 Utah 
Adv.Rep- 13 (March 6, 1990) (dictum); Cf. Colman v. Colman, 743 
P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1987). 
Before the equitable doctrine may be invoked there must 
be a concurrence of two circumstances: (1) There must be such a 
unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of 
the corporation and the individual no longer exist; and (2) the 
observance of the corporation form would sanction a fraud, promote 
injustice, or an inequitable result would follow. Norman v. Murray 
First Thrift and Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979). 
In Colman, supra. the Court of Appeals affirmed a decree 
which pierced and disregarded the veil of the defendant husband's 
corporations. In that case the assets held by the corporations 
were substantial as was the evidence demonstrating a unity of 
interest and ownership between the defendant and his corporation. 
In the instant case, the Commissioner apparently assumed 
that conclusory statements made regarding David J. Olsen & 
Associates had some probative value in reaching her conclusion that 
the existence of DKO Insurance Agency should be disregarded. 
Otherwise, it would have been pointless for her to have made 
findings regarding the operation of that corporation. 
The evidence regarding the operation of David J. Olsen & 
Associates is clearly insufficient to support the invocation of the 
"alter ego" doctrine. This was a corporation which had several 
employees, maintained a viable insurance agency, established a 
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photo processing lab, and accumulated hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in assets. 
The evidence is insufficient to establish a unity of 
interest and ownership between Plaintiff and DKO Insurance Agency 
and even if such a unity existed, the second prong of the test 
remains completely unsatisfied. There is no evidence that DKO 
Insurance Agency has been used as a vehicle for accumulating assets 
which the Plaintiff has attempted to shield from this Defendant or 
any other creditor. Indeed the only two corporate assets 
identified in the record are a 1986 automobile and a 1988 pickup 
truck. Furthermore, the record does not indicate what, if any, 
equity the corporation actually has in these two assets. 
In reversing a summary judgment which disregarded the 
existence of a defendant corporation, the Utah Supreme Court 
recently said: 
We have also said, "[t]he [alter ego] test's second 
prong is addressed to the conscience of the court, 
and the circumstances under which it will be met 
will vary with each case." Messick, 678 P.2d at 
794. However, that does not mean that a court has 
carte blanche to refuse to recognize the legal 
separation of shareholder and corporation. The 
second prong of the test is not met simply because 
a trial court finds that that form would in some 
way prevent a creditor of a controlling shareholder 
from quickly being made whole. The inequity 
contemplated by the second requirement of the alter 
ego test is not present just because the existence 
of the corporate form is inconvenient for a 
creditor seeking to pursue the shareholder's 
assets; it is not enough for the creditor to 
complain that it must proceed against the 
shareholder's assets, including the stock in the 
corporation, rather than simply levying on the 
corporation's assets. To find that "observance of 
the corporate form would sanction a fraud [and] 
promote injustice[] or an inequitable result would 
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follow," it must be shown that the corporation 
itself played a role in the inequitable conduct at 
issue. [citations omitted] 
Transamerica Case Reserve v. Dixie Power and Water, supra, 129 Utah 
Adv.Rep. at 14. 
It is difficult to see how the avoidance of this 
corporate entity will promote justice where it is apparent that the 
corporation is not a repository of assets which would otherwise be 
available for the execution of judgment against the Plaintiff. 
Furthermore, the evidence does not demonstrate that the 
corporate entity has been used as a vehicle for diverting income 
away from the Plaintiff and consequently his creditors. The 
testimony was unrebutted but the funds which have been available 
for the payment of Plaintiff's present wife's salary were in fact 
borrowed by the Plaintiff and/or his wife. 
The evidence indicates that the unavailability of the 
funds necessary to meet the Plaintiff's support obligation is in 
fact the result of catastrophic financial reversals precipitated by 
the breach of the MacLachlan contract rather than the result of 
some clever manipulation of DKO Insurance Agency or its assets. 
If the judgment stands, the specter of possible future 
applications of the principals of collateral estoppel may 
effectively cripple the corporation through which the Plaintiff is 
attempting to re-establish his livelihood in the insurance industry 
without affording the Defendant any appreciable relief. 
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POINT IV 
THE FINDINGS WHICH ARE IN FACT SUPPORTED BY 
EVIDENCE WILL NOT SUSTAIN A JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT. 
The Commissioner's finding that the Plaintiff "has been 
voluntarily unemployed" is not supported by the evidence. Clearly 
the Plaintiff's, as well as the Defendant's, long-term interests 
are best served by the development of the insurance agency which 
Plaintiff has initiated in Salt Lake County. Obviously the 
Plaintiff could take a "full-time job" which may immediately 
generate more income than he is currently earning. Nevertheless, 
the unrebutted evidence indicates that the course of action which 
the Plaintiff has selected will better serve the parties' long-term 
interests. 
The Commissioner's findings regarding the payment of 
medical expenses are on their face insufficient to support a 
judgment of contempt. Under the existing court orders the 
Plaintiff is responsible to provide health insurance for the minor 
children and to pay any medical expenses incurred by the children 
during the period of approximately three months when Plaintiff did 
not maintain a policy of health insurance (R. 194-197). 
Plaintiff in fact maintains health insurance on the 
children and the Defendant has failed to identify any obligation 
which was incurred during the period of time when Plaintiff had 
allowed the insurance coverage to lapse (T. 32-35). 
The Commissioner's findings regarding the fact that 
Plaintiff has not attempted to invade the corpus of the trust in 
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which he possesses a beneficial interest will not support a 
judgment of contempt. The evidence was uncontradicted that the 
Plaintiff is merely a beneficiary of the trust, the trust is 
administered by First Security Bank, the Plaintiff has no power to 
invade the trust, the trust was created and/or administered during 
the marriage between the parties and the Plaintiff has never 
invaded the corpus of the trust for any reason (T.27-29). 
Whether or not the Defendant or the minor children may 
themselves be able to reach the Plaintiff's trust income is another 
issue. See Comment b, Restatement 2d, Trusts §157 (1959). The 
fact that the Plaintiff has not attempted to break or invade a 
spendthrift trust created by his grandfather is certainly not 
evidence of contempt. 
The Commissioner's findings regarding the "luxurious 
home" and the "26-foot houseboat" which Plaintiff identified as his 
wife's property are not supported by evidence sufficient to sustain 
a judgment of contempt. These "revelations" were obviously a 
source of some aggravation to the Commissioner as well as the 
Defendant. However, the record is devoid of any evidence regarding 
the acquisition of these properties, the existence of any equity 
therein, the payment status of any concomitant obligation or the 
feasibility of restructuring or avoiding these obligations 
following the financial reversals suffered by the Plaintiff. 
Finally, the Commissioner makes certain findings and 
reaches certain conclusions related to Plaintiff's present wife's 
income. Plaintiff testified his wife's compensation was 
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established at $2,600 per month. The evidence was also unrebutted 
that funds were not always available for the payment of the agreed 
salary and that what funds were available were actually loan 
proceeds. The Commissioner's legal conclusion that Plaintiff's 
present wife owes these children some legal duty of support, under 
the facts of this case, sheds little light on the issue of the 
Plaintiff's contempt. 
At the outset of the contempt proceedings the 
Commissioner stated that the burden of proof would rest upon the 
Plaintiff (R. 5). See Hillyard v. District Court of Cache County, 
68 Utah 220, 249 P.806 (1926); De Yonoe v. De Yonqe, 103 Utah 410, 
135 P.2d 905 (1943). 
The Commissioner apparently concluded that the Plaintiff 
had failed to carry his burden and, while not imposing any jail 
sentence, the Commissioner did impose two fines in the amount of 
$100 each, neither of which could be purged by future compliance 
with any court order. These proceedings should therefore be 
considered criminal, rather than civil, in nature. Cf. Snow v. 
Snow, 13 Utah 15, 43 P. 620 (1896); Hillyard v. District Court of 
Cache County, supra. 
In Snow v. Snow, supra, the appellant was adjudged guilty 
of contempt for his refusal and neglect to pay alimony "and was 
given 30 days time in which to purge himself of the contempt." 13 
Utah at 17. The opinion notes a distinction between that class of 
contempt proceedings which are brought for the purpose of 
vindicating the authority and dignity of the court and contempt 
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proceedings which are remedial in nature and initiated for the 
purpose of enforcing a remedy for the benefit or advantage of the 
opposing party. The court concluded that the proceedings were 
civil in nature because the appellant could avoid punishment by 
compliance with previous court orders. 
In Hillyard v. District Court of Cache County, supra, the 
petitioner had been ordered "to pay to his former wife the sum of 
$100.00" and was remanded to the custody of the sheriff and 
committed to jail "until such payment was made." 68 Utah at 222. 
The Utah Supreme Court concluded that this too was a civil 
proceeding, citing Snow v. Snow, supra. 
In the instant case the Plaintiff was ordered to pay 
fines amounting to $200. No method was provided for purging the 
contempt, nor was the payment to be made for the benefit of the 
opposing party. This punishment was imposed for the purpose of 
vindicating the authority and dignity of the court. 
Under these circumstances, while the burden of going 
forward with the evidence may have properly been imposed upon the 
Plaintiff, the ultimate burden of proof should have been placed 
upon the moving party. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. — , 108 S.Ct. 
--, 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988). 
With the appropriate distribution of the burdens of proof 
in mind, the insufficiency of the evidence is more clearly 
demonstrated. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence does not 
19 
support the judgments of contempt and the judgment entered in the 
trial court should be reversed to that extent. Furthermore, even 
if this Court is inclined to affirm the findings of contempt, the 
findings and conclusions relating to DKO Insurance Agency should be 
stricken so as to deprive them of any application by way of 
collateral estoppel in future proceedings. 
DATED this 5th day of April, 1990. 
M. 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this 5th day of April, 1990, 
I did personally mail four true and correct copies of the above and 
foregoing document to Marilyn Joyce Perkins at P. 0. Box 1532, 
Overton, Nevada 89040. 
AS/ 
Gary W. Pendleton 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID J. OLSEN, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
MARILYN JOYCE OLSEN, ] 
nka MARILYN JOYCE PERKINS, 
Defendant. 
> MEMORANDUM DECISION 
> Civil No. 87-1303 
This matter came on for continued hearing on Defendant's 
Order to Show Cause on the 9th day of August, 1989 before Marlynn B. 
Lema, Domestic Commissioner, and Plaintiff was personally present in 
Court and represented by counsel, V. Lowry Snow and Defendant appeared 
pro se and the Court having heard testimony and having received 
evidence and being fully advised in the premises, having taken the 
matter under advisement, hereby renders its Memorandum Decision: 
CASE HISTORY 
1. That the parties were divorced April 24, 1987 in a 
bifurcated proceeding with Decree of Property Division and Child 
Support having been entered on July 8, 1988 based upon stipulation of 
the parties.. 
2. That pursuant to said stipulation and decree, Plaintiff 
agreed and was ordered to pay the sum of $190.00 per month per child 
as and for child support for each of the six minor children of the 
parties. 
3. That Plaintiff paid no child support for the months of 
July, August and September, 1988 resulting in Defendant's filing a 
Motion for Order to Show Cause to be heard on October 18, 1988. 
4. That said hearing was continued by written stipulation of 
the parties to November 1, 1988. 
5. A hearing was held on November 1, 1988 and Plaintiff 
failed to appear. A recommendation of contempt of court was entered 
for his failure to appear. 
6. Plaintiff had paid no child support for the period of 
July through October, 1988. Judgment was entered in favor of 
Defendant in the amount of $4,560.00. 
7. Plaintiff filed his objection to the recommendation of 
the Commissioner and during the pendency of said proceeding and on 
December 21, 1988 the parties stipulated yet again. No child support 
had been paid for November or December. Pursuant to said stipulation 
the hearing set for that day was continued and Plaintiff paid the 
support obligation for November and December, 1988 and agreed to pay 
obligation for January, 1989 before January 15. 
2 r\g~\g^ry^ *-i 
8. At a hearing before Judge J. Philip Eves on March 14, 
1989/ the parties once again stipulated. (No child support had been 
paid for January, February or March, 1989.) Plaintiff agreed to pay 
and paid child support obligation for January, February and March; to 
keep his child support current and to pay an additional sum of $200.00 
per month toward reduction of the outstanding judgment against him. 
9. That subsequent to said stipulation and corresponding 
Order of the Court, Plaintiff has made only partial payment of child 
support owing $1,680.00 for the months of May and June, $1,140.00 for 
the month of July with an additional $1,140.00 due and payable on the 
15th of August. In addition, Plaintiff has not made any of the agreed 
upon $200.00 per month installments on the oustanding judgment. 
10. On July 14, 1989, Defendant filed her Motion for Order 
to Show Cause and hearing was set for July 26, 1989. At the time set 
for said hearing, Defendant appeared and Plaintiff did not appear. 
Counsel for Plaintiff represented to the Court that Plaintiff's wife 
was pregnant requiring his presence to care for her and agreed that 
judgment should enter in the amount set out in the Motion plus the 
amount owing for the month of July. Plaintiff was ordered to appear 
on the issue of contempt on the 9th of August with medical 
documentation of the necessity of his absence at the July 26th hearing. 
11. At the hearing on August 9, Plaintiff appeared with 
counsel and defendant appeared pro se. The Court reserved the issue 
of contempt to August 15 to allow Plaintiff additional time to secure 
the medical documentation ordered at the prior hearing. Plaintiff 
failed to provide said documentation. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That since the divorce of the parties in 1987, Plaintiff 
has been voluntarily unemployed, subsisting on Trust benefits and 
other unidentified resources. That Plaintiff and his current spouse 
have, since the divorce, maintained a very comfortable lifestyle for 
themselves. 
2. That Plaintiff has paid support for his six minor 
children only when faced with imminent judicial proceedings and/or 
sanctions. 
3. That prior to the divorce of the parties, Plaintiff 
maintained a corporation described as a "holding" corporation for 
receipt of funds and disbursal of same for family necessities and 
living expenses such as automobiles, boats, airplanes and motorhomes. 
That this corporation was partially funded by Plaintiff's father. 
This corporation was identified as DJO and Associates. 
4. That in February, 1989, Plaintiff formed another closely 
held corporation (DKO Insurance Agency, Inc.) and is reestablishing an 
insurance business in the Salt Lake area. The office for the agency 
is in Plaintiff's home. Plaintiff is the insurance agent. 
Plaintiff's present wife is the bookkeeper for said agency and 
President of the corporation. For these services, the corporation 
pays her $2,600.00 per month. Plaintiff is paid nothing for his 
services. The current Mrs. Olsen's brother is Vice-President of the 
corporation and Plaintiff is the secretary. The Corporation owns a 
1986 Camaro (Iroc) and a 1988 pick-up truck and pays the insurance on 
same. Plaintiff and his wife use these vehicles as their own. That 
capitalization for said corporation was acquired from "loans" secured 
by notes owed to Plaintiff. 
5. Plaintiff and his wife enjoy the comfort of a large, 
luxurious home which Plaintiff says is the sole property of his wife. 
In addition, they have a 26-foot houseboat also (it is alleged) the 
sole property of Plaintiff's wife. 
6. That Plaintiff receives monthly dividends from a Trust 
fund (valued at approximately $200,000) in amounts varying between 
$400 and $1,500 per month. That Plaintiff has not requested advances 
on said Trust in order that he may support his minor children. That 
the trust will mature in the 1990*s. 
7. That Defendant lives with her current husband, her six 
children and a foster child in a mobile home in Overton, Nevada. 
Defendant does not work, is not trained to work and has children 
between the ages of 3 and 17 in her care. 
8. That Plaintiff was ordered to provide medical insurance 
for his minor children, but that for a period of time subsequent to 
the divorce he did not do so. In the stipulation of March 14, 1989, 
Plaintiff agreed to pay any and all medical expenses for said children 
incurred during the period when they were uninsured. 
9. That medical bills have been sent to Plaintiff by the 
health care providers in the approximate amount of $500.00 which 
Plaintiff has refused to pay; indicating to the Court that since he is 
not the custodial parent he has no legal obligation to pay said 
bills. (See also Defendant's Exhibit #1.) 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes 
as follows: 
n n n o o n 
1. That DKO Insurance Agency, Inc. is the alter ego of 
Plaintiff established to, among other things, insulate Plaintiffs 
assets from creditors, including Defendant's claim for past, present 
and future child support and to provide Plaintiff with a secure and 
comfortable lifestyle while he maintains that he has no income. Such 
activity promotes severe injustice to Plaintiff's children and 
constitutes fraud. (see Colman vs. Colman, 743 P.2d 782.) That the 
assets of said corporation are subject to action which defendant may 
bring to satisfy outstanding judgments she may have against Plaintiff. 
2. That Plaintiff has willfully refused to pay child support 
although he has repeatedly agreed to do so and has agreed to the 
amount of said support through numerous stipulations which he has 
failed to honor. For that willful refusal to pay Court ordered child 
support, Plaintiff should be held in contempt of this Court and should 
pay a fine of $100.00. 
3. That pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-4.1 a step-parent has a 
duty to support step-children and, therefore, the $2,600.00 salary of 
Plaintiff's current wife is considered funds available to Plaintiff to 
support his children. Defendant's husband has recourse against 
Plaintiff and/or his corporation for monies expended by him for the 
support of Plaintiff's children. 
4. That Defendant should be awarded judgment as against 
Plaintiff in the amount of $3,960.00 for the months of June, July and 
August, 1989 and is entitled to recover costs incurred in the bringing 
of this action plus expenses incurred in the bringing of this action 
and for attendance at two hearings. 
£ 
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5. Plaintiff is in contempt of this Court for his failure to 
appear at hearing on July 26, 1989 and for his failure to furnish 
documentation to support his excuse that it was necessary for him to 
care for his pregnant wife. Plaintiff should be held in contempt of 
this Court and should pay an additional fine of $100.00. 
Defendant is directed to submit to the Court within 10 days 
an affidavit of costs and expenses as set forth above. 
Defendant is further directed to prepare an Order on Order to 
Show Cause commensurate with this decision. 
Dated this %/^ day of August, 1989. 
MAtfLYNN B^ftMA 
Domestic i^ommissioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 
nd_ 
day of August, 1989, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION 
to the following: 
V. Lowry Snow 
P. O. Box 2747 
St. George, UT 84771-2747 
Marilyn Joyce Perkins 
P. O. Box 1532 
Overton, NV 89040 
David J. Olsen 
1923 Sunny Glen Circle 
Sandy, UT 84093 
C^Ut 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID J. OLSEN, 
VS. 
Plaintiff, 
MARILYN JOYCE OLSEN, a/k/a/ 
MARILYN JOYCE PERKINS, 
Defendant. 
^^^sr^e^ 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, 
ORDER IN RE: CONTEMPT AND 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 87-1303 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for continued 
hearing on Defendant's Order to Show Cause on the 9th day of August, 
1989, before Marlynn B. Lema, Domestic Commissioner. The Plaintiff 
was personally present in Court and represented by his counsel of 
record, V. Lowry Snow. The Defendant appeared pro se. The Court 
heard testimony and received evidence. After being fully advised in 
the premises, and having taken the matter under advisement, the 
Court issued its Memorandum Decision on or about August 21, 1989. 
Pursuant to that Memorandum Decision and the Order of this 
Court dated September 6, 1989, signed by Marlynn B. Lema, Domestic 
Commissioner, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as 
follows: 
1. The Defendant is awarded judgment against the Plaintiff in 
the amount of $3,960.00 for delinquent child support for the months 
M14/8 
m 
of Juire, July and August, 1989, together with her costs in the 
amount of $ JT %g. , for a total judgment of $ ¥t ¥Q. ' , said 
judgment to accrue interest at the rate of 12% per annum as provided 
by law. 
2. For his willful refusal to pay court ordered child support, 
the Plaintiff is hereby found in contempt and is ordered to pay a 
fine of $100.00. 
3. The income of Plaintiff's current wife is money available 
to Plaintiff to support his children. The Defendant's husband is 
entitled to recourse against Plaintiff and/or his corporation for 
monies expended by Defendant's husband for the support of 
Plaintiff's children. 
4. For Plaintiff's failure to appear at the hearing on July 
26, 1989, and his failure to furnish documentation to support his 
excuse that it was necessary for him to be absent in order to care 
for his pregnant wife, the Plaintiff is hereby found in contempt of 
court and is ordered to pay an additional fine of $100.00. 
5. The assets of DKO Insurance Company, Inc., an alter ego of 
Plaintiff established to insolate his assets from creditors, 
including Defendant's claim for past, present and future child 
support, are hereby ordered subject to action by Defendant to 
satisfy outstanding judgments she has or may have against the 
Plaintiff. The Defendant may execute against the assets of said 
corporation directly in order to collect judgments she has or may 
have against Plaintiff. 
DATED this £ ^ ° day of v ^ ^ ^ ^ l , 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
Marlynn^. Lema -^ ^X 
Domestic Commissioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct cppy of the 
above and foregoing document, postage pre-paid on the /4? day of 
,X j-f" , to David J. Olsen, 1923 Sunny Glen Circle, Sandy, 
Utah'^84093. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
VIRGINIA M. Corbitt, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE 
FINANCING, 
Respondent. 
i Case No. 890674-CA 
i Category No. 14a 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This is a petition for review of a formal adjudicative 
proceeding. Jurisdiction to hear this petition is vested in the 
Court of Appeals by Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16, 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Virginia M. Corbitt seeks review of a final decision of the 
Director of the Utah Department of Health (DOH), Division of Health 
Care Financing (DHCF), which affirmed in part and reversed in part 
a hearing officer's decision. The hearing officer found that 
Corbitt's first application for Medicaid was properly denied for 
failure to provide necessary verification of eligibility. The 
Director affirmed this holding. The hearing officer further found 
petitioner eligible for Medicaid on a second application, holding 
that a transfer on February 23, 1989 of certain assets was not 
1 
done in contemplation of an application for benefits under 
Medicaid. The hearing officer's order was reviewed by the Director 
of DHCF who affirmed the hearing officer as to the first ruling, 
but reversed the second ruling, finding that the transfer of assets 
violated the agency's policies and procedures, thereby making 
petitioner ineligible for Medicaid. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the Director of DHCF erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law in finding that petitioner's first application was 
properly denied for a lack of verification? 
2. Whether the Director of DHCF erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law in finding that the transfer of certain assets on 
February 23, 1989 was done in order to qualify for Medicaid, 
thereby disqualifying petitioner from receiving benefits? 
3. Whether the Director of DHCF was illegally constituted as 
a decision-making body or was subject to disqualification because 
of his interest in the financial matters of the Utah Medicaid 
program? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
42 U.S.C. S 1396a et seq. 42 C.F.R. S 435.911 
42 U.S.C. S 1396p(2) (c)(2) Utah-DSS Vol. IIIM S 565-2 
(1988) 2.B. (7-89) 
Utah-DSS Vol. IIIM § 565-3 
2. (11-89) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act provides that an 
appellate court may grant relief if it determines that a person 
2 
seeking review has been substantially prejudiced by the agency's 
erroneous interpretation or application of the law. Utah Code Ann. 
S 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1988). The Supreme Court has held that the 
correction-of-error standard applies to agency rulings on issues 
of law and extends no deference to them. Hurley v. Industrial 
Comm'n., 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988). Concerning issues 
involving mixed law and fact, an agency decision deserves some 
deference and will not be set aside unless it is unreasonable. Id. 
However, the deference given an agency in its area of expertise is 
not so expansive as to require a sanctioning of the agency's 
misinterpretation of its own statute and related rules. Boyd v. 
Dep't. of Empl. Sec, 773 P.2d 398, 400 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the case 
This is a request for review by the Court of Appeals of a 
final agency decision denying Virginia Corbitt Medicaid benefits. 
Corbitt requested a hearing, following denial of benefits on two 
applications for Medicaid benefits. The hearing officer found that 
Corbitt's initial application had been properly denied, since she 
had not supplied the necessary verification. He found that the 
denial of Corbitt's second application was improper, since property 
transferred by her prior to filing for Medicaid was done for 
purposes other than to qualify for Medicaid. The Director of DHCF 
reviewed the hearing officer's decision and affirmed the denial of 
the first application but reversed the second finding. Corbitt 
seeks reversal of the Director's decision and a declaration that 
3 
she has been eligible for Medicaid since the date of her original 
application. 
b. Course of Proceedings 
Corbitt filed her first application for benefits on March 16, 
1989. (Transcript of Hearing ("TH") 24) It was denied May 11, 
1989 for the reason that the necessary verification to determine 
eligibility was not provided. (Clerk's Notation of Record ("NR") 
53) Corbitt requested a hearing which was held September 12, 1989 
before Hearing Officer Cornelius Hyzer. (TH 2) The day prior to 
the hearing, Corbitt had filed a second application for Medicaid 
which was denied September 12, 1989 for the reason given that 
Corbitt had transferred her share in property held jointly with 
her son, Whitney Corbitt, on February 23, 1989 at less than fair 
market value and for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid. (NR 
56) On September 20, 1989, the hearing officer affirmed the first 
denial but reversed the second, finding that Corbitt had not 
transferred property in order to qualify for Medicaid. (NR 28) The 
Director of the Medicaid agency reviewed the formal order and, in 
an order on review issued October 20, 1989, affirmed the first 
finding, but reversed the second. (NR 21) Corbitt filed her 
petition for writ of review on November 20, 1989. (NR 9) 
c. Disposition at the Medicaid Agency 
The final agency action denied Corbitt Medicaid on both of her 
applications. The final result of the agency's action is that she 
will remain ineligible for Medicaid up to 30 months from the date 
of transfer. (TH 51-52) 
4 
d. Relevant Facts 
Virginia Corbitt is an eighty-one-year-old woman who until 
June 1986 resided with her son, Whitney Corbitt, at a home owned 
jointly with him. (TH 48). At that time, Corbitt left the family 
home and moved to a retirement center. (TH 48) On September 12, 
1986, she deeded one-half of the home to her son by a quit claim 
deed. (NR 47) Corbitt remained in the retirement home until 
February 13, 1989 when she fell and was taken to St. Mark's 
Hospital. (TH 46-47) She remained in the hospital until February 
23, 1989 when she was transferred to Care West Nursing Home in Salt 
Lake City. (TH 46) 
Prior to leaving the hospital, Corbitt signed a quit claim 
deed conveying the other half interest in the home to her son, 
Whitney Corbitt. (TH 46, NR 51) She also signed a durable power 
of attorney, appointing her son, Whitney Corbitt, as her attorney 
in fact. (NR 49) 
At the time Corbitt was placed at Care West Nursing Home, she 
was receiving Medicare benefits which paid for her hospitalization 
and initial nursing home stay. (NR 73) On March 16, 1989, 
following expiration of her Medicare eligibility, Corbitt's son 
applied for Medicaid benefits on behalf of his mother. (TH 24) 
Whitney Corbitt obtained the Medicaid application from Christine 
DeBlasio, a social worker at Care West. (TH 4) Certain 
verification was needed for approval of the application, which 
Whitney Corbitt attempted to obtain. (TH 18-20) The requested 
verification was not supplied and the application was denied on May 
5 
11, 1989. (NR 53) A hearing was requested and held on September 
127 1989 before Hearing Officer Cornelius Hyzer. (TH 2) The day 
before the hearing, Whitney Corbitt submitted a second application 
for Medicaid which was denied September 12, 1989. (NR 56) The 
reason given for the denial was that the applicant had transferred 
a share of her home in February 1989 without receiving fair market 
value and for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid. (NR 56) 
Corbitt was advised that the sanction period for the denial would 
be the lesser of thirty months or the fair market value of the 
property transferred divided by $1,530.00. (NR56) 
At the hearing, Whitney Corbitt appeared and testified that 
the verification required to complete the first application was 
delayed, because he had had difficulty obtaining documentation from 
his attorney. (TH 31) He testified that Virginia Corbitt conveyed 
the half interest in the home to him on February 23/ 1989 on the 
advice of his attorney. (TH 44) He testified his mother was in the 
hospital at the time and that the transfer needed to be done, but 
was not done to hide assets in order to qualify for Medicaid. (TH 
44) The transfer was donef according to Whitney Corbitt/ to avoid 
the possibility of his mother becoming incapable of signing over 
the title to him. (TH 44) He testified that the previous half 
interest was transferred to him in 1986 on the advice of his 
attorney in order to protect the property during a divorce 
proceeding. (TH 44) He testified that in February 1989/ the 
divorce was final and it seemed to be a good time in which to 
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transfer the other half# since his ex-wife no longer had a claim. 
(TH 45, 56) 
The social worker, Christine DeBlasio, testified that at the 
time Virginia Corbitt was admitted to the nursing home, it was not 
expected that she would remain there for a long period of time. (TH 
8) She noted that petitioner's treating physician, Dr. John B. 
Stanchfield, had stated that to his knowledge Virginia Corbitt 
would be able to return to her home after a short stay at the 
nursing home. (NR 32, TH 9-10) DeBlasio testified that because of 
Virginia Corbitt's declining medical condition, including a series 
of small strokes, it was determined in mid-March that she would not 
be able to return home and that an application for Medicaid should 
be initiated. (TH 61-62) 
A representative of the Medicaid agency who appeared at the 
hearing, testified that Corbitt's second application was denied on 
the basis of state policy contained in Vol. Ill S 565-2. The 
representative testified that it is the Medicaid agency's policy 
to sanction a client who transfers property on the same day as 
entering a nursing home. (TH 51) The agency representative 
testified in part: 
[B]ecause of the situation, because of the 
medical condition at the point of the transfer 
with her medical condition being that way and 
entry into the nursing home on that same day, 
we were basically saying that it was a 
transfer to become eligible for Medicaid, so 
we would apply the sanctions that I have just 
indicated there. (TH 54) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Federal Medicaid regulations controlling Corbitt's case do not 
mandate a denial of Medicaid benefits, when verification is not 
completed within a 45-day period. A Medicaid agency is permitted 
to keep the file open indefinitely, pending completion of the 
application by the claimant. In this case, the Director erred in 
finding that Corbitt's initial application was properly denied. 
The Federal statutes and regulations provide that a Medicaid 
applicant who seeks benefits for nursing home care may be denied 
eligibility for a transfer of assets, unless a satisfactory showing 
is made that the transfer was for purposes other than to qualify 
for Medicaid. In this case, the hearing officer correctly found 
that the transfer of assets was proper. The Director of DHCF, in 
reviewing the hearing officer's decision, applied an erroneous 
standard by concluding that an inference of ineligibility may be 
drawn when an applicant enters a nursing home on the same day she 
transfers property. The Director articulated no legitimate reasons 
for reversing the favorable decision. But for the improper state 
policy, the Director should have affirmed the hearing officer's 
decision finding Virginia Corbitt eligible for Medicaid. 
The Director was not an impartial person for purposes of 
reviewing the hearing officer's decision. He had an interest in 
the financial affairs of the Medicaid program. Thus, he should 
have been disqualified from reviewing the case. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DIRECTOR'S DECISION UPHOLDING THE DENIAL OF CORBITT'S 
FIRST APPLICATION FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE VERIFICATION 
SHOULD BE REVERSED, SINCE IT IS BASED ON AN ERRONEOUS 
INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION OF THE MEDICAID LAW. 
The hearing officer held, and the Director of DHCF affirmed, 
that Corbitt was not entitled to Medicaid eligibility on the basis 
of her March 16, 1989 application, for the stated reason that she 
had not provided verification as required by state policy and 
procedure. Corbitt's son, Whitney Corbitt, applied for benefits 
on March 16, 1989 on behalf of his mother and was advised to 
provide certain verification by March 28, 1989. Her son was uncible 
to obtain the necessary documentation until the time of the hearing 
on September 12, 1989. Certain bank records were provided to the 
hearing officer within five days of the hearing as requested. (NR 
13-20) However, the hearing officer held the denial of the first 
application to be proper, because Corbitt's son failed to provide 
the requested verification within the time limit set by the 
caseworker. The caseworker testified that there was "a time period 
of 45 days" in which to make a decision on Corbitt's application. 
(TH 25) Caseworker Anita Peterson also testified that 45 days was 
the limit for processing an application: "There's 45 days or we 
have to deny." (TH 28) 
The hearing officer noted that the 45 day time limit for 
providing verification may be extended by the agency, but concluded 
it was unreasonable to expect the application to be held open 
indefinitely pending verification. (NR 29) A review of the 
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Medicaid statute and regulation shows that a Medicaid agency is 
not required to deny Medicaid when verification is not provided 
within the 45-day time limit. The Director has failed to identify 
a sufficient legal basis for concluding that the March 16, 1989 
application was properly denied. 
Medicaid is a complicated federal/state health program which 
has been described as "among the most intricate ever drafted by 
Congress." Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43, 69 L.Ed. 
2d 460, 101 S. Ct.2633 (1981). Since Medicaid is a joint health 
care effort between the federal government and participating state 
governments, legal determinations necessarily involve a 
consideration of both state and federal law, with federal law 
controlling under the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution. 
This interrelationship has been well summarized in the case of 
Buc kner v. Maher, 424 F.Supp. 366, 369 (D. Conn. 1976). 
Implementation of a Medicaid program is authorized in the state of 
Utah by Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.1 (1988). 
Neither the relevant federal statute nor the implementing 
regulation prescribes a strict time limit for determining Medicaid 
eligibility. The relevant portions of the federal Medicaid statute 
provide as follows: 
A state plan for medical assistance must — 
.... 
(8) provide that all individuals wishing to 
make application for medical assistance under 
the plan shall have opportunity to do so, and 
that such assistance shall be furnished with 
reasonable promptness to all eligible 
individuals; 
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(19) provide such safeguards as may be 
necessary to assure that eligibility for care 
and services under the plan will be 
determined, and such care and services will be 
provided, in a manner consistent with 
simplicity of administration and the best 
interests of the recipients; 
(34) provide that in the case of any 
individual who has been determined to be 
eligible for medical assistance under the 
plan, such assistance will be made available 
to him for care and services included under 
the plan and furnished in or after the third 
month before the month in which he made 
application (or application was made on his 
behalf in the case of a deceased individual) 
for such assistance if such individual was (or 
upon application would have been) eligible for 
such assistance at the time such care and 
services were furnished; 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8),(19),(34) 
The relevant federal regulation governing timely 
determinations of eligibility is found at 42 C.F.R. § 435.911 and 
provides as follows: 
(a) The agency must establish time standards 
for determining eligibility and inform the 
applicant of what they are. These standards 
may not exceed — 
(1) Sixty days for applicants who apply for 
Medicaid on the basis of disability; and 
(2) Forty-five days for all other 
applicants. 
(b) The time standards must cover the 
period from the date of application to the 
date the agency mails notice of its decision 
to the applicant. 
(c) The agency must determine eligibility 
within the standards except in unusual 
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circumstances, for example — 
(1) When the agency cannot reach a decision 
because the applicant or an examining 
physician delays or fails to take a required 
action, or 
(2) Where there is an administrative or 
other emergency beyond the agency's control. 
(d) The agency must document the reasons 
for delay in the applicant's case record. 
(e) The agency must not use the time 
standards — 
(1) As a waiting period before determining 
eligibility; or 
(2) As a reason for denying eligibility 
(because it has not determined eligibility 
within the time standards). 
The state policy and procedure manual which applies the 
federal laws provides: 
Eligibility Decisions 
1. Deadline for Determining Eligibility 
A. An eligibility decision must be made within 45 days 
of the date of the application. There is one exception: 
a decision must be made within 90 days of the date of the 
application if a disability determination must be made 
as part of the eligibility determination. 
If a decision cannot be made before the deadline, 
document the cause of the delay in the case record. 
Utah-DSS Vol. IIIM § 703-5 l.A. 
Verification 
What Must Be Verified? 
All factors of eligibility must be verified. 
There is only one exception to this rule. It is called 
"The Prudent Person Concept". This assumes that, as a 
prudent person, you can use your professional judgment 
to decide if something can be left unverified. If you 
decide to accept the client's word for something instead 
of verifying it, document it in the case record or 
application form. Utah-DSS Vol. IIIM S 731-1. 
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Who Must Provide Verification? 
It is the responsibility of the applicant or recipient 
to obtain acceptable verification of eligibility factors. 
Help the client to get the verification if the client 
needs help. Utah-DSS Vol, IIIM § 731-2. See Addendum 
The fesderal law and regulations do not mandate denial of a 
Medicaid application when the applicant does not complete 
verification within a forty-five day period. Instead, the law sets 
out a general requirement of forty-five days, with certain 
exceptions. One of the exceptions contained in the federal 
regulation is when the applicant delays in taking a required 
action. In this case, the providing of additional verification was 
a required action which was delayed by causes beyond Corbitt's 
control. She relied on her son, Whitney Corbitt, to accomplish her 
Medicaid eligibility. Hie testified that because of his inability 
to obtain documents from his lawyer, it was not possible to 
complete the application within the stated time period. (TH 31) 
This should have been considered by the hearing officer as an 
extenuating circumstance which, under the federal regulation, would 
permit the application file to be kept open beyond the forty-five 
day time limit. The Medicaid agency caseworker should not have 
closed Corbitt's file, but should have simply noted in the file the 
reason for the delay. Instead, the caseworker applied an improper 
state policy which directed denial at the end of 45 days. 
A state Medicaid agency cannot adopt a policy which 
contradicts federal law. It is well established in the case law 
that a state regulation is invalid if found to be inconsistent with 
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the federal statute governing the program. Townsend v. Swank, 404 
U.S. 282, 286, 92 S. Ct. 502, 30 L.Ed. 2d 448 (1971); King v. 
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333, 88 S. Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed. 2d 1118 (1968). 
While a state's participation in Medicaid is voluntary, once it 
elects to participate in the program, it must fully comply with 
federal statutes and regulations. Smith v. Miller, 665 F.2d 172, 
175 (7th Cir. 1981). A participating state does have some 
discretion in establishing time limits for filing claims, but such 
limits have been construed as directory in nature, from which 
exception should be granted to avoid an injustice when the facts 
so demand. Matter of King James Nursing Home, 351 A.2d 363, 367 
(1976). 
When the facts in the case are considered in light of the 
above-referenced law, it should be concluded that Corbitt was 
improperly denied Medicaid eligibility on her first application. 
The hearing officer did not consider the express language of the 
federal regulation which permits additional time for determining 
eligibility when delays are caused by the applicant. Since the 
federal law does not require a denial of an application under these 
circumstances, any explicit or implicit requirements in the state 
regulations requiring denial are inconsistent and invalid under the 
Supremacy Clause. The federal regulation clearly reflects 
congressional intent to permit exceptions to a harsh time limit 
when equity and justice so require. The facts of this case 
demonstrate a solid basis for such an exception. Corbitt was 
incapable of completing her own Medicaid application. She relied 
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on the assistance of her son who made a good faith effort to comply 
with the caseworker's requirements. Since the federal law does not 
strictly require compliance with a forty-five-day time limit, the 
hearing officer should have granted more latitude and considered 
the date of the first application as the effective date of 
eligibility. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED, SINCE THE 
DIRECTOR ERRED IN APPLYING THE LAN IN FINDING 
THAT CORBITT TRANSFERRED ASSETS IN ORDER TO 
QUALIFY FOR MEDICAID. 
The Medicaid statute has for some time allowed states to 
impose a penalty on persons who transfer assets in order to qualify 
for Medicaid to cover nursing home expenses. Until recently, the 
sanctioning of persons who made such transfers was optional. 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1983). The statute provided that states could 
deny assistance when a transfer was made within 24 months of 
application, provided they specified a procedure implementing such 
denial which was no more restrictive than that set forth in 42 
U.S.C. § 1382b(c)(1983). The referenced section was contained in 
that portion of the Social Security Act governing the Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) program and contained a similar penalty for 
transfers during a 24-month period. Additionally, the statute 
created a presumption that such transfers were made to establish 
eligibility for assistance unless the applicant furnished 
"convincing evidence to establish that the transaction was 
exclusively for some other purpose." 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(c)(2)(1983) 
15 
On July 1, 1988, the statutes referenced above were amended. 
The Medicaid statute was amended to require states to sanction 
individuals who transferred property for less than fair market 
value during a 30-month period prior to applying for Medicaid. 42 
U.S.C. S 1396p(c)(l)(1988) Deleted from the Medicaid statute was 
the previous cross-reference to the SSI statute in 42 U.S.C. § 
1382b(c). Instead, the Medicaid statute was revised to provide 
that an individual need only make a "satisfactory showing" that the 
transfer was made for a purpose other than to qualify for Medicaid. 
Specifically, the statute now reads: 
(2) An individual shall not be ineligible for 
medical assistance by reason of paragraph (1)_ 
to the extent that — 
(C) a satisfactory showing is made to the 
State (in accordance with any regulations 
promulgated by the Secretary) that (i) the 
individual intended to dispose of the 
resources either at fair market value, or for 
other valuable consideration, or (ii) the 
resources were transferred exclusively for a 
purpose other than to qualify for medical 
assistance. 42 U.S.C. S 1396p(c)(2)(C)(1988) 
At the time of Corbitt's hearing, the hearing officer applied 
state regulations which were not in strict compliance with the 
federal statute. Included in the record as Exhibit 4 is Section 
565-2 of Vol. IIIM regarding transfers of assets on or after July 
1, 1988. (NR 57) The applicable portion of that regulation 
provided as follows: 
Do not sanction the client if the client can 
prove the asset was not transferred in order 
to become eligible for Medicaid. It is the 
client's responsibility to provide evidence 
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that a transfer was made for another purpose 
AND that Medicaid was not even a minor factor 
in the decision. If a reliance upon Medicaid 
can be inferred, sanction the client. 
(emphasis added) Utah DSS-Vol. IIIM § 565-2 
(7-89)1 
Despite the state's use of a regulation which was more 
restrictive than required by the Medicaid statute, the hearing 
officer correctly found that Corbitt had established sufficient 
evidence to overcome the presumption that she had transferred 
property to her son in order to qualify for Medicaid. Although the 
hearing officer did not use the "satisfactory showing" standard, 
it is clear from his decision that he felt the resources in 
question were transferred for a purpose other than to qualify for 
Medicaid. Reviewing the hearing officer's decision in light of the 
correct standard cited above, it should be concluded that his 
decision was based on substantial evidence as articulated in his 
decision. Because of its relevance, the hearing officer's summary 
is quoted in extenso; 
lfrhe pertinent section has since been revised to remove the 
offensive final sentence. The most recent version of the IIIM 
manual reads: 
Do not sanction the client if the client can 
prove the asset was not transferred in order 
to become eligible for Medicaid. It is the 
client's responsibility to provide evidence 
that a transfer was made for another purpose 
AND that Medicaid was not even a minor factor 
in the decision. Follow the guidelines in 
Sec. 565-3. Utah-DSS Vol. IIIM S 565-2.B (2-
90) 
The guidelines referred to in section 565-3 are contained in 
the Addendum. 
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The Petitioner in this case was fully aware of 
her desire to transfer her assets as an 
inheritance to her son and had taken steps to 
do so in 1986. Under advice of counsel, and 
with a divorce pending, it was prudent to 
delay the transfer of the remaining equity in 
the property to him until the divorce was 
concluded. The testimony of the Petitioner's 
son was that there was no expectation 
whatsoever that she would be requiring 
Medicaid when she had other insurance 
available and it was anticipated that this 
would be short term stay. It was the 
intervening small strokes that caused the 
petitioner to lose her mental faculties, 
creating a pressing need to obtain Medicaid 
benefits. This all took place subsequent to 
the quit claim deed being signed on February 
23, 1989. The law provides for a presumption 
that the transfer of assets was done in 
contemplation of application for Medicaid 
benefits, but the testimony of the 
Petitioner's son rebuts the presumption and 
therefore prevails. The only evidence 
presented at the hearing on this issue showed 
that the Petitioner was anticipated to have a 
short stay at the nursing home which would 
preclude any expectation of a long term stay, 
especially of the type of serious nature that 
developed in this Petitioner's medical 
condition. (NR 28) See Addendum 
When the hearing officer's decision reached the Director of 
DHCF, an incorrect standard was applied in reviewing the findings. 
The Director states in his decision: 
In this case, the Division of Health Care 
Financing finds that based upon the hearing 
record, a reliance upon Medicaid can be 
inferred....Reliance upon Medicaid can be 
inferred when an eighty-one-year-old woman 
such as petitioner enters a nursing home, 
gives her son the power-of-attorney and quit 
claims her dwelling to him on the same 
day....However, a reasonable inference can be 
drawn that reliance upon Medicaid was 
contemplated....(emphasis added) (NR 23-24) 
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The Director erred in not applying the proper standard for 
judging whether a transfer of assets was made to qualify for 
Medicaid. The statute clearly requires that an applicant need only 
make a "satisfactory showing"; it says nothing about drawing an 
inference from facts established at the hearing. The hearing 
officer had already found that the presumption of a disqualifying 
transfer had been overcome. To allow the Director in reviewing the 
decision to draw a different inference from the facts results in 
the presumption being reconstituted and, in effect, makes it 
irrebuttable. Such a result is not condoned in the law. See 
People in Interest of S.P.B., 651 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Colo. 1982). 
Reliance on an inference in a case of this type was rejected 
in Harrison v. Comm'r, 529 A.2d 188 (Conn. 1987) wherein the 
Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed a transfer of assets under the 
old statute. The Connecticut Medicaid agency had included a 
"foreseeability test" in its manual and provided that if an 
applicant had failed to retain sufficient assets to meet 
foreseeable needs for 24 months after the transfer, "it must be 
inferred" that the transfer was not made exclusively for some other 
purpose than to qualify for Medicaid. The court began its analysis 
by noting the fundamental rule that an administrative agency must 
act within its statutory mandate and "has no authority to modify, 
abridge or otherwise change the statutory provisions under which 
it acquirers authority." Id., at 192. The court reviewed the 
Connecticut regulations under the old "convincing evidence" 
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standard of 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(c) and concluded that the department 
policy was inconsistent with federal and state statutes. 
An overly restrictive transfer of assets rule was also 
reviewed and rejected in Randall v. Lukhard, 709 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 
1983) The court held that a Virginia rule requiring documentary 
evidence in every case showing that a claimant has other resources 
available at the time of transfer to cover present and expected 
future medical expenses was excessive. The court found it highly 
improbable that disabled individuals would be able to objectively 
demonstrate availability of other assets to avoid disqualification. 
The court stated: 
We think that they should not be rendered 
ineligible if by other credible evidence, 
short of documentary proof, they can establish 
that theirs was a lawful purpose. Id., at 267 
In Downer v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 705 P.2d 144 (Nev. 
1985), a ninety-year-old individual who transferred property to his 
daughter and son-in-law prior to applying for Medicaid was held to 
be not disqualified. The court concluded that the Medicaid 
applicant could not have anticipated an application for Medicaid, 
because he believed his death was imminent. 
Recent amendments to respondent's regulations further suggest 
that the "inference" language is not permissible. As noted, the 
offending sentence has now been removed. See supra. at 17, n.l. 
Second, a set of guidelines has been added for determining whether 
a transfer was made in order to qualify for Medicaid. Utah-DSS 
Vol. IIIM § 565-3 (11-89). Although the guidelines may be 
questionable in light of Randall v. Lukhard, supra, they do contain 
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two criteria which lend support to petitioner's argument. The 
section provides in part: 
Some Factors Indicating the Transfer Was Not 
to Become Eligible 
Here is a list of some factors which may 
indicate the client did not transfer assets to 
become eligible and did not expect Medicaid to 
meet his needs after the transfer. This list 
is not all-inclusive. 
A. The client suddenly, unexpectedly, became 
disabled AFTER the transfer. 
B. The client learned that he has a disabling 
condition AFTER the transfer. Utah-DSS 
Vol. IIIM § 565-3 2. (11-89) 
In this case, the evidence established, and the hearing 
officer found, that Corbitt's incapacitating condition arose after 
she was admitted to the nursing home on February 23, 1989. Based 
on respondent's own regulations, that finding is entitled to 
substantial weight. The hearing officer who reviewed Corbitt's 
case, and who had the best opportunity to judge her credibility, 
concluded that the transfer of property was not made for a 
disqualifying purpose. When his decision was reviewed by the 
Director, an improper standard utilizing an inference was applied. 
At the time of the review, the Medicaid statute did not contain any 
language allowing the Director of DHCF to draw an inference from 
facts established at a hearing. Instead, the Director was required 
to determine whether a satisfactory showing had been made that the 
transfer was for some purpose other than to qualify for Medicaid. 
The Director articulated no legitimate reasons for reversing the 
hearing officer's decision. His reversal represents an arbitrary 
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act in complete disregard of the Medicaid statute. Under the 
principles of law governing the relationship between the state and 
federal participants in the Medicaid program, it was improper for 
the Director to apply such a standard. A review of the law and the 
record shows that the hearing officer applied the correct legal 
standard and identified substantial evidence upon which to base 
his decision. Therefore, the Director's decision should be 
reversed and the hearing officer's holding reinstated, finding 
Corbitt eligible for Medicaid. 
POINT III 
THE DIRECTOR'S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED 
SINCE HE WAS SUBJECT TO DISQUALIFICATION 
BECAUSE OF HIS FINANCIAL INTEREST IN 
THE MEDICAID PROGRAM. 
The statute establishing the Medicaid program also provides 
that an opportunity for a fair hearing must be provided to 
individuals denied medical assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(3) (1983). 
The statute is implemented in the federal regulations at 42 C.F.R. 
S 431.200 et seq.. The regulation provides that the state's 
hearing system must provide for: 
(1) a hearing before the agency; or 
(2) an evidentiary hearing at the local level, with the 
right of appeal to a state agency hearing. 
42 C.F.R. § 431.205(1985) 
The regulation then provides that if a local evidentiary hearing 
decision is adverse to an applicant or recipient, the agency must 
inform the individual of a right of appeal to the state agency. 
42 C.F.R. S 431.232 The regulations require that a state plan 
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provide the necessary means for meeting the hearing requirements 
listed. 
The state of Utah provides hearing rights in its regulations 
for applicants and recipients. Utah Admin. Code § R455-14 et seq. . 
A hearing officer is to conduct a fair hearing, but is not 
empowered to issue a final agency decision. Instead, at the 
conclusion of the formal hearing, the hearing officer is to submit 
a recommended decision to the executive director of DOH who will 
then decide whether to accept or reject it. Judicial review is 
then to be allowed from the executive director's decision. See 
Addendum. 
The result of the review system established by the state of 
Utah DOH is that every fair hearing decision is reviewed by the 
Director of the Medicaid program who is also responsible for 
conserving the limited resources of the Medicaid program. Utah 
provides by statute for creation of DHCF and for the appointment 
of a Director by the DOH executive director. Utah Code Ann. § 26-
18-2.2. Among the responsibilities of the director of DHCF is to 
"prepare and administer the division's budget..." Id. The statute 
further provides that the division "is responsible for the 
effective and impartial administration of this chapter in an 
efficient, economical manner." Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.3. 
Finally, it provides: 
The division shall establish, on a statewide 
basis, a program to safeguard against 
unnecessary or inappropriate use of Medicaid 
services, excessive payments, and unnecessary 
or inappropriate hospital admissions or 
lengths of stay. Id. 
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It is well established in the law that an adjudicator of an 
administrative claim is disqualified if he has a pecuniary interest 
in the outcome. Myer v. Niles Township, 477 F.Supp. 357# 362 (N.D. 
111. 1979). The adjudicator is disqualified even if the pecuniary 
interest is no more than an indirect outgrowth of a desire to 
protect official funds. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 
57, 93 S. Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed. 2d 267(1972) (A mayor responsible for 
village finances and whose court generated village funds was 
disqualified from trying traffic offenses.) In Myer, the court 
held that a panel of township supervisors who had the sole 
discretion to determine an applicant's eligibility for medical 
indigent benefits and who also had an interest in protecting 
township funds could not provide a fair hearing before an unbiased 
decision-maker. Myer v. Niles Township, supra, at 362. 
In this case, Director Betit has a direct, statutorily-
mandated obligation to protect and conserve scarce Medicaid funds. 
Given Director Betit's pecuniary interest in protecting Medicaid 
funds, he could not act as an impartial agency officer in reviewing 
Corbitt's claim. Therefore, he should have been disqualified from 
reviewing the hearing officer's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The Director erred in finding that Corbitt's first application 
was correctly denied. He further erred in reversing the hearing 
officer and finding a disqualifying transfer of assets. The 
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Director's decision should be reversed and Medicaid benefits 
granted from the date of the first application. 
Respectfully submitted this^?A^ day of /ff^fcA^ , 1990. 
[CHAEL E. BULSON 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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A D D E N D U M 
VOLUME IIIM 2-90 
TRANSFER OF ASSETS - Transfers On or After July 1, 1988 
565-2 Ti^ ajisf_eiLS„.0n„Qt:_ AF. ter_ . Ju ly._L_1988 
1. Nhen to Sanction Clients 
Sanction clients who transfer assets for less than fair market 
value to become eligible for Medicaid. It does not matter if 
the client is a resident of a medical institution or approved 
for the Home and Lommunity-Based Care Waiver at the time of the 
transfer. 
2. When NOT to Sanction Clients 
Do not sanction clients in these situations: 
A. Do not sanction the client If the asset was transferred 
more than 30 months prior to the date of the application. 
Bo Do not sanction the client if the client can prove the 
asset was not transferred in order to become eligible for 
Medicaid. It is the client's responsibility to provide 
evidence that a transfer was made for another purpose AND 
that Medicaid was not even a minor factor in the decision. 
Follow the guidelines in Sec. 565-3. 
C. Do not sanction the client if the sanction would be an 
undue hardship. Follow the rules in Sec. 565-4. 
D. Do not sanction the client if the transfer fits one of the 
following situations. (The "5 OK Transfers") 
(1) Transfer .of a home to the spouse. 
(2) Transfer of any asset to a spouse OR a blind or 
disabled son or daughter. 
(3) Transfer of a home to a son or daughter under 21 years 
of age. 
(4) Transfer of a home to a sibling who has an equity 
interest in the home and who has lived in the home for 
at least 1 year immediately preceding the client's 
entry into a medical institution. 
(5) Transfer of a home to a son or a daughter who has 
lived in the home and cared for the client for at 
least 2 years prior to the individual's entry into the 
medical institution. 
VOLUME IIIM 2-90 
TRANSFER OF ASSETS - Transfers On or After July 1, 1988 
3. Secondary Transfers After October 1. 1989 
If assets have been transferred without sanction because the 
situation Is one identified In Sec. 565-2 #2(D), sanction the client 
If the asset 1s transferred again AFTER October 1, 1989 for less than 
fair market value. 
Sanction the Individual making the first transfer. The sanction 
period for the Individual must be based on the value of the asset 
that person transferred. If the person making the secondary transfer 
also transfers some of his own assets 1n addition to the assets 
received from the first transfer, that person may also be sanctioned. 
The sanction period for either individual begins on the date of the 
secondary transfer. 
THERE IS ONE EXCEPTION TO THIS RULE: Do not sanction anyone if the 
secondary transfer also fits one of the situations in Sec. 565-2. 
EXAMPLE: 
Mary and Bob Jones were both identified on the deed as ownnf\s of their home, which 
is worth $36,000. Before entering a nursing home in June, Mary transferred her 112 
interest in the home to her husband. Mary was not sanction for this transfer because 
Sec. 565-2 #2(D) says that a client may transfer any asset to a spouse without being 
sanctioned. 
In October, Bob Jones signed a quit claim deed giving the house to his son for $1.00. 
His son is over 21, not disabled, and had not been living in the house prior to the 
transfer. Bob is sanctioned for the transfer of his half of the house. Mary is sanctioned 
for the half of the house she gave to Bob and he transferred. The sanctions begin in 
August for both of them. 
4. How to Sanction the Cl ient 
Clients who are sanctioned for t ransferr ing assets are not e l i g ib le 
for i ns t i t u t i ona l care or Home and Community-Based Care. They may be 
e l i g i b l e for regular Medicaid services. Apply the Medicaid policy In 
Volume H ID . 
Report the c l i e n t ' s name and PACMIS ID number to either PDU or Health 
Care Financing. You may do this on the phone, in w r i t i ng , or by 
PACMIS Mailbox addressed to Jennifer P. Lee. 
565-2 Page 2 
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5. getting the Sanction, Pgrigd 
A. The period of ineligibility begins with the month in which the 
assets were last transferred. The client is ineligible for the 
LESSER of: 
(1) 30 months, OR 
(2) the number of months resulting from dividing the 
uncompensated value by the average private-pay rate for 
nursing homes. The uncompensated value is the difference 
between the equity value of the transferred asset and the 
amount of money received by the client for it. (Equity 
value is the fair market value minus any indebtedness 
against the asset.) See Table II for the average 
private-pay rate for nursing homes. 
565-2 Page 3 
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565-3 Transfer to Become Eligible 
Do not sanction the client If the client can prove that Medicaid was 
not a reason for the transfer. The client must also prove that he 
did not expect Medicaid to meet his needs after transferring the 
asset. 
1. Verification 
It Is the client's responsibility to provide all supporting 
documentation, such as legal documents, realtor agreements, 
relevant correspondence, and statements from other Individuals. 
If the client needs help getting these, a worker may help. 
If the client claims that Medicaid was not a factor In the 
decision to transfer the asset, ask the client to write a 
statement explaining: 
A. The reason for the transfer 
B, Attempts to transfer the asset for fair market value 
C- The reason for accepting less than fair market value 
D. The client's plans for providing for himself after the 
transfer 
E. The cl1entfs relationship i - • - the asset 
P. - ^ e c'^ot believes he received fair market value for 
tne asset 
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2. Some Factors Indicating the Transfer Has Not to Become Eligible 
Here 1s a l i s t of some factors which may Indicate the client did 
not transfer assets to become eligible and did not expect 
Medicaid to meet his needs after the transfer. This l is t is not 
all- inclusive. 
A. Th6 client suddenly, unexpectedly, became disabled AFTER 
the transfer. 
B. The client learned that he had a disabling condition AFTER 
the transfer. 
C. The client unexpectedly lost other assets, worth more than 
the Medicaid asset l imit , AFTER the transfer. 
D. The transfer was court-ordered. 
E. The assets were transferred to a religious order by a 
member of that order in accordance with a vow of poverty. 
Mr, Johnson applied for Medicaid in May. The previous June, he had sold assets 
worth $8,000 for $6,000, He explained that he sold the assets to pay $4,000 in medical 
bills. He accepted less than fair market value because he needed the money quickly 
and could not wait for a better offer. When he transferred the money, his countable 
assets were loo high for Medicaid because he also owned farmland in Nevada worth 
$12,000. In January, he and his wife separated. She was given the farmland in the 
divorce decree. Now his assets are below the asset limit, Mr. Johnson's claim that he 
did not transfer the assets to become eligible should be accepted because he tried to 
sell the asset for fair market value AND he would have remained ineligible for 
Medicaid if he had not unexpectedly lost the farmland. 
In February, Mrs. Mason transferred assets worth $53,000 to her daughter in exchange 
for a life estate in the daughter's home. The life estate is worth $40,000. She did it 
because she was elderly and no longer able to live alone. She did not want to move 
into her daughter's home without paying her for it in some way. DO NOT accept Mrs. 
Mason's claim that the transfer was not done to become eligible. Mrs. Mason knew 
that she was getting older and would probably need medical care in the future. The 
home could have been sold for fair market value and the difference between its value 
and the life estate value could have been used for her medical needs. Instead of 
reserving her assets to provide for her medical care, she impoverished herself This is 
evidence of an expectation that Medicaid would take care of her medical needs. 
565-3 Page 2 
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703-5 Eligibility Decisions 
1. Deadline for Determining Eligibility 
A. An eligibility decision must be made within 45 days of the 
date of the application. There Is one exception: a 
decision must be made within 90 days of the date of the 
application if a disability determination must be made as 
part of the eligibility determination. 
If a decision cannot be made before, the dead 111 ie( dc ci tmei it 
the cause of the delay In the case record. 
B. If unverified eligibility factors do not affect the 
eligibility of the entire household (For example, the 
client has not given proof of citizenship for one child.), 
the application may be approved for those members 
determined elIgible. 
The application cannot be approved if unverified 
eligibility factors affect the whole household. (For 
example, the wages of a working parent are unverified.) 
2. Certification of Decision 
Indicate the eligibility decision on the last page of Form 61A 
or Form 61FC. Record the eligibility decision on Form 727 Case 
Action Log. 
A. If the application is denied, note the date and the reason 
for the denial. 
B. If the application is approved, Indicate the date and 
category of assistance. 
3,. Notification of Approval or Denial 
If the application Is approved or denied, notify the applicant 
in writing of the approval or denial, the reason for the action, 
the policy citation 1n this manual, and the Social Services 
office to contact for information on the income method used to 
determine the spenddown. 
4 ALERTS and PENDS 
Put an ALERT on a case when a change 1s expected to occur before 
the next review if that change will not affect eligibility. 
Put a PEND on a case if a change is expected to occur before the 
next review if that change will affect eligibility. Also use 
PENDS to ensure that Information or proofs are collected from 
the clientc 
703-5 
VOLUME IIIM 7-89 
VERIFICATION 
731 Verification 
731-1 What Must Be Verified? 
All factors of eligibility must be verified. 
There isvonly one exception to this rule. It.is called "The Prudent 
Person Concept". This assumes that, as a prudent, person, you can use 
your professional judgement to decide if something can be left 
unverified. If you decide to accept the client's-word for something 
instead of verifying it, document it in the case record or 
application form. 
731-2 Who Must Provide Verification! 
It is the responsibility of the applicant or recipient to obtain 
acceptable verification of eligibility factors. Help the client to 
get the verification if the client needs help. 
731-3 What is Acceptable Verification? 
Verification may be those items listed on the Verification Tables or 
other documents accepted by the district worker. 
File copies of acceptable documents in the case record. When a 
narrative record is used to record verification of items for which 
there is no document, attach a sheet of paper in the case record. On 
the sheet of paper, explain how that item was verified. Sign and 
date the paper. 
731-4 Primary VQjdJlgAtjon 
The verification tables list examples of acceptable verification for 
each eligibility factor for the appropriate category and program. 
Once an eligibility factor has been verified, no further verification 
is necessary unless it is an. item subject to cliau^ e aud would be 
reverified at a regular time. 
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pliance had occurred. The written request from the 
provider must be submitted by him/her to: 
Division of Health Care Financing 
Bureau of Program Review 
ATTN: PEER REVIEW 
PIO. Box 16580 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116-0580 
This written request will be submitted to the app-
ropriate Professional Society requesting that their 
Peer Review Committee conduct a formal peer 
review of the Division of Health Care Financing 
determination. 
The informal hearing requirements' of Sec. 26-23-
i-(l) UCA, (1953) are satisfied by1 the professional 
peer review process.' 
If either the Division of Health Care Financing or 
the the provider is dissatisfied with the results of the 
formal peer -review they may request a formal 
hearing before the Department of Health pursuant to 
Sec. 23-32-2, UCA (1953) by complying with the 
formal hearing procedures set forth in the Division 
of Health Care Financing ADMINISTRATIVE 
HEARING PROCEDURES. 
In situations of violations of compliance of prof-
essionally recognized medical standards, identified by 
peer review, the Division of Health Care Financing 
may pursue any legal sanction for recovery of over-
payments; 
• Should Federal Financial Participation (the amount 
the federal government contributes to provider rei-
mbursement) be disallowed on reimbursements made 
to the provider, the provider" will reimburse to the 
State the total amount that the State paid for the 
services disallowed (including' Federal audit, quality 
assurance review,' or prior authorization requirem-
ents) only if the provider was at fault. 
I9ST 26°l~$ 
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R455-14-0. Policy Statement 
R455-14-1. Administrative Hearing Procedure* Provide 
R455-14-2. Discovery 
R455-I4-3. Declaratory Orders 
R455-14-0. Policy Statement 
It is the policy of the Division of Health Care 
Financing to resolve disputes at the lowest level. The 
following rules are not meant to foreclose the Divi-
sion's preference, for informal resolutions through 
open discussion and negotiation between the DiviJ 
sion, and applicants, recipients and providers. 
R455-14-1. Administrative Hearing Procedures 
Provide 
Ai HEARING PROVISIONS 
1. Hearing Responsibility 
a.« In accordance with Section 1902(a)(3) of the 
Social Security Act, 42 Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR) Part- 431, Subpart E, Sections 26-M.l and 
26-23-2 IL C.'AJ (1953), and 63-46b-l, et seq. 
U.
 tC. AJ (1987)/ ail* Title XIX (Medicaid)/Utah 
Medical Assistance Program (UMAP) recipients or 
providers (and applicants under certain circumsta-
nces) aggrieved by any action; or inaction of the 
Department'of Health (DOH), Division of Health 
Care Financing (DHCF), will be given an opportu-' 
nity for a hearing upon written request. M i ' l« - ^ i 
bo A hearing < is not required and will not < be 
granted to an applicant,4recipient 'of J"provider if the 
sole issue(s) is a Federal or State law'or'policyRequ-
iring an automatic change in covered services • adver-
sely affecting some or all (applicants) \ recipients or 
providers (42 CFR 431.220). 
f
 c. A hearing also is not required'and will'not'be 
granted to a. provider for Medicaid certification 
surveys, plans of correction pursuant to thbse surveys 
or inspections of care, when such state' agency action 
is required by' federal1 statute, or regulation' to be 
conducted according to federal procedures '(Section 
63-46b-l(2)(l) U. / C. * A.' (1988)/ ,42 " CFR, i,431, 
Subpart D).'< 
(1) Any Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF),1 Intermed-
iate Care Facility (ICF) or Intermediate Care Facility/ 
Mentally
 t Retarded (ICF/MR) ,whose certification or 
provider' agreement is denied, terminated'- or* not 
renewed Will be governed by, the evidentiary hearing 
procedures set forth in 42 CFR 431.153,1 including 
appropriate cross-references to 42 * CFR : Part 498, 
with the offering of an informal reconsideration in 
accordance with 42 CFR* 43 L154 prior to the cond-
ucting of a full evidentiary Rearing. All of "the federal 
regulatory citations in this subsection' are incorpor-
ated herein as if set forth in full. 
(2) Any SNF, ICF'or ICF/MR ; whose'payment 
for new admissions is denied will be governed by the 
informal hearing procedures set forth in 42 CFR 
442.118 and 442.119, includingJ appropriate' cross-
reference to 42 CFR 489.62 as specifically^concerns 
SNFs. All of the federal regulatory citations in this 
subsection are incorporated herein as if set'forth in 
full. 
2. Applicability 
" EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED 'HEREIN;'* THESE 
PROVISIONS ONLY -APPLY TO1 TITLE XIX 
MEDICAID/UMAP ' RECIPIENTS^ OR' * PROVI-
DERS. These rules do not apply to initial applicat-
ions for 'medical "assistance. *A'* Medicaid/UMAP 
4
 applicant who has been denied eligibility for medical 
assistance through 'the local Office' of Community 
Operations (OCO), Assistance Payments11 Administr-
ation (APA), Department1 of1 Social Services^ (DSS), 
must submit a written request for an eligibility dete-
rmination hearing' to: The Department, of-# Social 
Services1, Office of Administrative Hearings, <#P. 0. 
Box 45500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0500 Or the 
applicant may deliver the written request in person to 
the local OCO. 
3. Eligibility Hearing ' for * both Non-Medical 
Assistance AND Medical Assistance 
If eligibility for a non-medical» assistance 
program(s) in addition to Medicaid/UMAPf is "at 
issue, the Medicaid/UMAP eligibility determination 
hearing shall be conducted by the Department' of 
Social. Services through the Office of Administrative 
Hearings. Requests for such hearings shall be* sent 'to 
the address in Section 2, above. All such hearings 
shall be conducted according to DSS hearing rules. 
DSS shall propose a recommended decision 'concer-
ning the medical assistance issue(s) 'only and shall 
submit it to the Executive Director pf DOH or his/ 
her designated representative for agenc/ review. 
Thereafter the recommended' decision "shall 'be 
handled in accordance with 'SectionsV 63-466-12 
and 63-46b-15,U.C.A. (1987). 
4. Eligibility Hearing For Medical Assistance Only' 
i AH requests for hearings to consider eligibilityf as 
to medical assistance only, shall beJ forwarded^"by 
DSS to DHCF* A formal hearing irr'accordance with 
the hearing procedures herein shall be. conducted!by 
DHCF. 
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* 5. Definitions" 
' The definitions of the5 Utah Administrative Proc-
edure fAct» (UAPA), Section 63-46b-l, et seq., U. 
C.J-A.* (1987) as set forth in Section 63-46b-2 are 
hereby incorporated by reference. In addition: ' 
a. "Action" means a' denial of Medicaid/UMAP 
eligibility as5 regards an'applicant; denial, termina-
tion, suspension, or - reduction of Medicaid/UMAP 
covered services in the case of recipients; or, a red-
uction or denial of reimbursement for such services, 
findings of licensing survey deficiencies requiring a 
Plan of Correction, failure of DHCF to accept a 
Plan of Correction required by licensing, or other 
sanctions as "set forth' in "DHCF ADMINISTRA-
TIVE SANCTIONS" PROCEDURES AND GUIDE-
LINES', R455-22, in the case of providers. 
b. 'Aggrieved Person* means any applicant, reci-
pient or provider' aggrieved by any action or inaction 
of DHCF. 
c. "Date of''Action*'means the date on which a 
denial of eligibility for, termination, suspension or 
reduction' of Medicaid/UMAP covered services 
becomes effective, in the case of applicants or reci-
pients; or, in the case of providers the date on which: 
1
 (1) A reduction oi* denial or reimbursement or 
sanction becomes effective; 
(2) Notice is given of licensing1 survey'deficiencies; 
or
 i * > 
(3)'Notice'Is' given that'lDHCF will not accept a 
plan of correction of survey deficiencies required by 
licensing. 
d. "Division Director* means the Director of the 
Division of" Health Care Financing of the Utah 
Department of Health or his/her designated and 
authorized representative. ' • 
e. "Executive Director* means the Executive Dir-
ector vof the Utah Department of Health or his/her 
designated and authorized representative.
 t 
f.
 ;*Formal Hearing" means a hearing before a 
hearing officer, conducted in* accordance with 
UAPA. 
' g, "Notice"* means a written statement of the 
action DHCF intends to take, the reasons for the 
intended action, the specific regulations that support 
(or the change in Federal or State law that requires) 
the'action, the right to a hearing when applicable, 
the procedure to obtain a hearing, and an explana-
tion of the circumstances under which Medicaid/ 
UMAP benefits or reimbursement will be continued 
if a hearing is requested. 
, hM "Request for a Formal Hearing*" means a clear 
expression in, writing which meets the criteria of a 
"Request for Agency Action* as set forth by Section 
63-46b-3(2)(c), U. >C. A, (1987) by an aggrieved 
person or authorized representative. 
6. Notice
 (, 4 
a. When Notice Required 
Every individual who is affected by an adverse 
action taken by DHCF will be given timely notice. 
b. Content of Notice ,
 ( 
A notice under this Section must contain: , 
t(!) A statement of the action DHCF intends to 
take; 
(2) The date the intended action takes effect; 
u (3) The reasons for the intended action; 
(4) The specific regulations that support, or the 
change in Federal or State law or policy, that requ-
ires the action;
 t 
4(5) tThc ^aggrieved person's right to request a 
formal hearing before DHCF, when applicable, and 
the method by which such hearing may be obtained 
from DHCF;
 m 
' (6) A statement that the aggrieved person may 
represent himself or use legal counsel, relative, friend 
or other spokesman at the formal hearing; and, ' 
(7) An explanation of the circumstances "under 
which' Medicaid/UMAP coverage or reimbursement 
will be continued if a formal hearing is timely requ-
ested. 
c. Advance Notice 
DHCF will mail a notice at least ten (10) calendar 
days before the date of the intended action EXCEPT 
as noted below: 
(1) DHCF may mail'a notice not later than the 
date of action if: 
(a) DHCF has factual information confirming the 
death of a recipient/provider; 
(b) DHCF receives a clear written statement signed 
by a recipient/provider that: 
1) He/she no longer wishes services or reimburs-
ement, or ' 
2) Gives information that requires termination or 
reduction of services or reimbursement and indicates 
that he/she understands that this must be the result 
of supplying that information; 
(c) The recipient has been admitted to an institu-
tion where he/she is ineligible under the State Plan 
for further services; 
(d) The recipient/provider's whereabouts are 
unknown and the Post Office returns DHCF mail 
directed to him/her indicating no forwarding 
address; 
(e) DHCF establishes the fact that the recipient has 
been accepted for Medicaid/UMAP services by 
another local jurisdiction, State, Territory or Com-
monwealth; " 
(0 A change in the level of medical care is prescr-
ibed by the recipient's physician; or 
(g) A termination, suspension or reduction of 
Medicaid/UMAP covered services or reimbursement 
is necessitated- by an imminent peril to the public 
health, safety, or welfare. 
(2) DHCF may shorten the period of advance 
mailed notice to five (5) days before the date of 
action if: 
(a) DHCF has facts indicating that action' should 
be taken because of probable fraud by the applicant/ 
recipient/provider; and 
(b) The facts have been verified, by affidavit, if 
possible. 
7. Request for Formal Hearing and Agency Resp-
onse 
Formal hearings are held for "medical assistance 
only" issues. If an aggrieved person's request for an 
eligibility hearing concerns both non-medical assis-
tance and medical assistance, he should refer to R455-
14-l.A.3,above. 
An aggrieved person may request a formal hearing 
within the following -deadlines, depending upon the 
type of request: 
a. An aggrieved UMAP or Medicaid provider may 
request a formal hearing within 30 calendar days 
from the date written notice is issued or mailed, 
whichever is later, by DHCF of an action or inac-
tion. ' , 
b. An aggrieved Medicaid applicant or recipient 
may request a formal hearing regarding eligibility for 
"medical assistance only" within 90 calendar days 
from the date written notice is issued or mailed, 
whichever is later, by DHCF of an action or intended 
action. , » » 1 ! 
c. An aggrieved UMAP applicant or recipient may 
request a formal hearing regarding eligibility within 
90 calendar days from the date written notice is 
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issued or mailed, whichever is later, by DHCF of an 
action oc intended action, 
d. An aggrieved UMAP applicant or.recipient may 
.request a formal hearing regarding scope of service 
within 30 calendar days from, the date written notice 
is .issued or mailed, whichever is later,, by
 t DHCF of 
an action or intended action^ 
e. Failure to submit a timely request for a formal 
hearing will constitute a waiver
 fof a person's formal 
hearing* or pre-hearing rights. A request for a 
hearing shall be in writing, shall be dated,,and shall; 
explain the reasons for which the hearing is reque-j 
sted. An aggrieved person may use the hearing 
request form which, is attached to all negative eligi-< 
bility action notices, or the form which is provided in 
Attachment "A,*- which is entitled "Requests for 
Hearing/Agency Action." DHCF will provide copies 
of*the, form in• Attachment A to all interested, 
persons. The address for submitting a "Request' forj 
Hearing/Agencyk Action" for: (a) Medicaid or 
UMAP providers; and (b) Medicaid or UMAP scope 
of service hearings is as follows: 
Division of Health Care Financing 
,. Attention: Formal Hearings 
M . P.O. Box 16580 • • < 
' Salt Lake City, Utah 84116-0580 
The address for submitting a "Request for Hearing/ 
Agency,,Action for Medicaid and UMAP applicants 
regarding eligibility issues is: 
The Department of Social Services 
~ Office of Administrative Hearings 
^P .O.Box 45500 
„. Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0500
 f 
f. Requests for formal hearing will be docketed 
and scheduled within 30 calendar days. DHCF as 
respondent shall schedule a hearing or begin negoti-' 
ations in the matter in writing within 30 days of the 
date of issuance ot the request for formal hearing or 
agency action. '' • 
i 8. Denial or Dismissal of Request for a Hearing 
« DOH or DHCF may deny or dismiss,a,request forj 
a formal hearing if:, ,' ', , \ 
a. The aggrieved person withdraws the request in 
writing; , . , . „ , , , , , , ' 
b. The aggrieved person fails to appear at a ,sche-, 
duled hearing without good cause; or i 
c. The provider fails to allow DHCF access to its 
records pursuant to R455-14-2 below. 
9, Reinstatement/Continuation of Services
 ( 
^ a. DHCF may reinstate services for recipients or, 
suspend any adverse action for providers as defined 
in Section 5.a if an aggrieved person requests an; 
formal hearing not more than ten (10) calendar days, 
after the date of action. ' '1r !' \ 
b. DHCF must reinstate or continue services forj 
recipients or suspend adverse actions for providers 
until a decision is rendered after a formal hearing if: j 
(I) Adverse action is taken without giving the ten 
(10) day advanced mailed notice to a recipient/ 
provider in all circumstances where such' advance 
notice is required; ' \ ' ' ' ' ! [' '*' | 
" (2) In those circumstances where advance notice is 
not required, as set forth in section 6.c.(l); the agg-" 
rieved person requests a formal hearing within ten} (10) calendar' days following the date the adverse 
action notice is mailed; r • } - '' J''"' . <* ' i 
(3)1 DHCF determines that the action resulted from1 
other'than the application of Federal or State law or 
policy. 
c. DHCF may proceed with it} intended action if:< 
' " ( l ) T h e aggrieved person withdraws'his request fori 
either a formal hearing in writing; or, 
u i : , • , i * 
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(2) The aggrieved ' person prolongable,,Rearing 
process without good cause; or, 
" ( 3 ) A j recipient's whereabouts. > are i unknown,'>, as 
indicated by the return of agency mail .directed" to 
him/her which is not forwardable,, 
n, 10. Formal Hearing > ' > 
';
 t a. How to Request a Formal Hearing 
A request for a formal hearing must, be made to 
the Division of Health . Care Financing, 2881 North 
1460 West, P. O. Box 16580,'Salt Lake City, Utah 
84116-0580, Attention: "Formal Hearings.*-
b. Notice of Formal Hearing 
DHCF shall notify the aggrieved, person and/or 
his/her attorney, in writing, of the date, time and 
place, of the hearing. Notice, shall *be mailed not less 
than ten (10) calendar days, before the scheduled, date 
of the formal hearing. 
1 c. Form of Papers 
All papers to be filed in a formal hearing shall) 
(1) Be typewritten or legibly hand-written; 
' (2) Bear a caption clearly showing, the t i t le of the 
hearing; 
,
 > (3) Bear the docket number, if any; , (4) Be dated and signed by the party or his/her 
authorized representative and shall,, contain > his/her 
address and telephone number; and >l "< * :i>t\ • V!^J 
, (5) Consist of an, original and two (2) copies tailed 
with DHCF. 
Hearings may be delayed until»these requirements 
are met. 
d. Service 
j (1) The party filing papers and documents shall 
serve them upon all parties to the formal
 r hearing. 
Proof of service shall be filed with DHCF.» J,'
 r ,. ' / 
(2) Service shall be personally delivered or by mail, 
properly addressed with postage prepaid,', one (1) 
copy to each party entitled thereto. When at party is 
representee! by an attorney, service upon the attorney 
shall be deemed service upon the party or parties-., 'l ' 
(3) Proof of service shall be by certificate, affidavit 
or acknowledgment. *' «" • »i *! "* X\'J ." 
(4) Wherever notice by DHCF is required, notifi-
cation shall be effective upon the date of first.class 
mailing to a party's residence or business address. *')** 
(5) In addition to the methods set forth. in, these 
rules, a party may be served in any manner permitted 
by law. 
' e. Intervention 
l>
 As permitted by ' Utah ' Code rAnn!k 63-46b-10, 
' intervention will be permitted provided the following 
requirements are met: 
(1) Persons desiring to intervene in a formal 
hearing must petition for leave to intervene'at least 
seven (7) days before the scheduled hearing,,'.unless 
otherwise permitted by the hearing officer. * • '. 
(2) The petition must contain a clear and concise 
statement of the direct and substantial interest of the 
person seeking leave to intervene in the hearing. l *J 
(3) Persons seeking affirmative relief shall state the 
basis of such relief.' 
(4) Other parties to the hearing ' must, have an 
opportunity to support or oppose intervention. /}*" *K 
' (5) The hearing'officer may grant leave'to inter-
vene subject to such reasonable conditions as he may 
prescribe. An intervenor may be 'dismissed from the 
hearing if it appears that he has no direct or substa-
ntial interest in the hearing. 
f. Conduct of Hearing 
(1) Formal hearings shall be conducted by an 
impartial hearing officer who is appointed by DOH. 
The hearing officer shall be empowered with1 such 
authority as granted by Section 63-46b-U; et seq. 
COIN «C<» 
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U. O * A * (1987), except as may be limited by these 
ruJcs4 ,No
 t hearing t officer- shall have been directly 
involved Jn, the.i initial determination* of. the action in 
question.' 
\it (2) i All formal - hearings shall be ^conducted only 
after adequate written notice of the hearing has been 
served.on all parties setting forth the time,.date and 
place of the hearing, , ' 
t (3) Testimony shall be taken.; under oath; or affir-
mation administered by the hearing officer^ 
(4) Each party shall have the right to:, *, 
(a) call and examine parties and witnesses: 
(b) introduce exhibits; 
(c) question opposing, witnesses and parties on any 
matter relevant to the issue even though the matter 
was not covered in the direct examination; , . . * 
(d) impeach any witness regardless of which party 
first called him/her to testify; and 
(e) rebut the evidence against him/her. 
g (5) The rules of evidence as applied in civil actions 
in the courts of this* State shall be generally followed 
in the hearings.' Any relevant evidence may be adm-
itted if It is the type of evidence commonly relied 
upon byi prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. 
Hearsay»ievidencc;mayj be used for the purpose of 
supplementing or explaining other evidence, but shall 
not be sufficient by, itself to support a finding unless 
it would be admissible over objection in civil actions. 
The,hearing officer shall give effect to the rules of 
privilege recognized». by law.** Irrelevant, immaterial 
and unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded. > 
•r (6), J*heshearing officer may order-the taking of 
interrogatories and depositions and assess the expense 
to the requesting; party if the hearing officer deems it 
proper. 
;. (7) The} hearing of fleet] may questioa any party i or 
witness(and may admit,any evidence he believes is 
relevant or material. 
.•, (8).The hearing.officer shall control the taking of 
evidence in. a manner best. determined to be best 
suited to ascertain the.facts and safeguard the rights 
of the parties. The, hearing officer shall explain the 
issues and the/ order in which evidence will be rece-
ived. 
c (9) A i party has the burden of proving, by a prep-
onderance _ of u the., evidence whatever, facts in must 
establish to, sustain its position. A provider always 
has the burden of proof to show that services were, 
in fact, rendered as billed. 
so (10) Jhe burden of proof as to a particular > fact Is 
on the party against .whom a finding on that fact 
would be required in the absence of further evidence. 
g. Ex Parte Communications 
(1), Except as otherwise provided below, ex parte 
communications are prohibited.
 t ', v , (2) The hearing officer shall decline to listen to or 
accept any communication offered in violation of 
this rule and shall explain to the oTferor that any 
communication received off the record and in viola-
tion of this rule must be made a part of the record 
and furnished to all parties. 
(3) This rule shall ^OT apply to. 
, (a)-The disposition' of ex parte matters authorized 
by law;'or1 
t (b), Communications ^ concerning "status of the 
hearing and uncontested procedural matters. 
h. Continuances or Further Hearings 
'/(\i{ The hearing. Officer may continue" a formal 
Waring to''another* time or place, or order a further 
hearing on his/her own motion or upon the showing 
of good cause, at the request of any party.
 f wn t (2) ' Where \ the " hearing officer determines (hat 
Cm>u«Co 
additional evidence is necessary for the proper dete-
rmination of the case,»he/she may at his/her dis-
cretion: 
i (a) Continue'the hearing to a later date and order 
the party to produce additional evidence; or 
., (b) Close the hearing-and hold the record open- in 
order to permit the introduction * of additional docu-
mentary evidence. Any evidence so submitted shall be 
made available' to both parties and each party»shall 
have the opportunity for rebuttal. 
(3) Written notice of the time and place of a con-
tinued or further hearing shall be given in accordance 
with Section lO.b, except that when a continuance is 
ordered during a hearing and adequate oral notice is 
given. 
i. Record 
A complete Vecord of all formal'hearings shall fje 
made. The testimony shall be electronically recorded 
and/or memorialized by court reporter. The recor-
ding and/or memorialization shall be transcribed if 
requested by' a party to the hearing. The requesting 
party shall pay the costs of transcription and for 
copying costs. At the conclusion of the formal 
hearing, the complete record of the hearing will be 
maintained in a secured area and shall be considered 
the sole property of DHCF. DHCF or its designated 
a g e n t wi l l re ta in e l e c t r o n i c r e c o r d i n g s / 
memorialization of formal hearings Tor a perjod of 
one (1) year. Written records and documents will be 
retained for a period not to exceed three (3) years. 
j . Proposed Decision and Final Agency Review 
(1) At the conclusion of the formal hearing! the 
hearing officer shall take the, matter, under advise-
ment and shall submit to the Executive Director of 
DOH a proposed decision, based on the evidence and 
testimony introduced at the hearing. ' ,JI{ 
(2) The proposed decision shall be in writing and 
shall contain findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
(3) The Executive Director of DOH may; ., 1 > 
(a) adopt the proposed decision, or any portion qf 
the decision.
 f , t 
(b) reject' the proposed decision, or any portion 
thereof, and make his own independent determina-
tion based upon the record.
 f » '* H (c) remand the matter to the hearing officer to take 
additional evidence; and the hearing officer therea-
fter shall submit to the Executive Director of POH a 
new proposed decision. ^
 )t, (4) Review by the Executive Director constitutes 
agency review and final administration action, and is 
subject to judicial review in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in Subsection 10.1. 
(5) The aggrieved person or his/her representative 
shall be notified of the final' administrative action 
and the aggrieved person's right to judicial review of 
the action.
 t% / (6) When the final administrative action is favor-
able to the aggrieved person, DHCF shall promptly 
take corrective action. 
(7) Subject to provisions for safeguarding "confide 
ential information, all hearing decisions shall be kept 
on file for public inspection. 
k. Agency Review ' -,•> »j 
!
 Reconsideration. Section 63-46b-13 Utah ' Code 
Ann. 1953, as amended, is hereby incorporated by 
reference. 
,
 ; I. Judicial Review 
(1) Judicial review of a final agency action "may be 
secured by the aggrieved party by filing a petition in 
the Utah Court of Appeals within thirty (30) days 
after issuance of the Executive Director's final 
administrative action. The petition shall be served 
_ _ _ _ 
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upon the Executive Director and shall state the 
grounds upon which review is sought. The Executive 
Director shall file with his/her Answer certified 
documents, papers, transcripts of all testimony taken 
in the matter, recommended findings of fact and 
conclusions of law of the hearing officer and the 
final administrative action of the Executive Director. 
-'t(2) Judicial review of final administrative action is 
governed by Section 63-46b-16 and Section 63-
46b-l, et seq. U. C. A. (1987), and Section 78-2a-
3,U.CA.(1953); 
R455-14-2. Discovery 
A. DISCOVERY PROVISIONS 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are inapplicable 
to these proceedings and no formal discovery except 
as set forth hereinafter shall be permitted. Unless 
otherwise limited by order of the hearing officer, the 
scope of discovery 'in formal adjudicative proceedings 
shall be as follows: , , 
1. Review of Applicant/Recipient and Provider 
Records 
a. DHCF shall be permitted to review all records 
which are pertinent to the hearing which are in the 
custody or control of the applicant or recipient and 
their health care providers. DHCF shall give at least 
three (3) days' written notice the custodian of such 
document(s). 
b, DHCF shall be allowed to inspect a provider's 
records which are pertinent to the hearing. Inspection 
shall be made at the provider's business office during 
regular working hours and after at least three (3) 
days written notice. 
2. Review of DHCF Records and Files 
a. Before the Formal Hearing 
Upon prior written request, the aggrieved person 
or his/her representative will be permitted to 
examine all documents and records to be used by the 
State at the formal hearing, not later than three (3) 
days before the formal hearing.'The aggrieved party 
may request the Medicaid Management Information 
System (MMIS) claim file. This will be available for 
review fifteen (15) calendar days after DHCF receives 
a written request for the information. 
b. At the Formal Hearing 
The aggrieved person or his/her representative 
will be given an opportunity to: 
' (!) Examine the aggrieved person's case file and 
all documents and. records to be used by DHCF at 
the hearing; 
(2) Bring witnesses to the hearing; and 
(3) Establish all pertinent facts and circumstances. 
3. Pre-hcaring Procedure 
a. The hearing officer may elect to hold a1 pre-
hearing meeting for any of the following reasons: 
' (1) to formulate or simplify trie issues; 
(2) to obtain admissions of fact and documents 
which will avoid unnecessary proof; 
(3) to arrange for the exchange of proposed exhi-
bits or prepared expert testimony; 
(4) to outline procedures to be followed,, at the 
formal hearing; or 
(5) to agree to such other matters as may expedite 
the orderly conduct of the hearing or the settlement 
thereof., 
'Agreements reached during the conference shall be 
recorded or the parties may enter into a written sti-
pulation or agree to a.statement made on,the,record 
by the hearing officer,^ 
4. Interrogatories,, Depositions, and .Requests for 
Admissions 
a., The, hearing officer, may order the' taking of 
570 
interrogatories and depositions, and c set 'appropriate 
time-frames, assess sanctions for non-compliance, 
and assess the expense to the requesting1 party if * the 
hearing officer deems it proper. 
*' b. The «hearing officer may* permit the 1 filing > of 
Requests for Admission,!" set appropriate'4 time-
frames for responses, and assess sanctions'fori1 nom 
compliance. 
' 5. Medical Examination 
a. The hearing officer may order'at DHCF-expense 
a medical assessment in order to obtain information 
necessary for a fair decision. This information 
subject to confidentiality requirements shall be* made 
a part of the formal hearing record. 
1
' 6. Witnesses and Subpoenas 
• a. A party shall arrange for the presence' of |iis 
witnesses at the hearing. 
b. A subpoena to compel the "attendance ~ of J a 
witness or the* production of evidence'may' be issued 
by the hearing officer, upon written' request by a 
party and a sufficient showing of need, 
c. A subpoena may also be issued by the hearing 
officer on hrs own motion *u 
d. An application for subpoena duces tecum'' for 
the production by a witness of' books, papers, corr-
espondence, memoranda, or other records shall be 
made by affidavit to the hearing officer. 1 The > appli-
cation must include: 
1
 (1) The name and address of the person or.'entity 
upon whom the subpoena is to be served; 
(2) A description of the documents, papers, books, 
accounts, letters* photographs,1 objects,"or' tangible 
things not privileged, that which the applicant seeks; • >'; 
(3) A showing of the materiality* to>» the issue, invo-
lved in the hearing; and 
> (4) A statement by the applicant that to the best' of 
his knowledge the witness has. such items in his pos* 
session or under his control. 
e. The applicant shall arrange "to have all* subpo-
enas served which the hearing officer issues to him. 
A copy of the affidavit presented to the* hearing 
officer shall be served with the subpoena. 
f. Except for employees of DOH, witnesses sunp-
oenaed for any hearing are entitled to appropriate 
fees and mileage. The witness^ shalF file a written 
demand for the fees with the hearing officer not later 
than ten (10) days after the date the witness appeared 
at the hearing. 
7. Sanction by Hearing Officer 
fa. The hearing officer may t sanction* or> penalize 
any party that fails'to obey an r order entered by the 
hearing officer. 
R455-14-3. Declaratory Orders 
As required by Section 63-46b-21,/ U / .C* A. 
(1987), this rule provides for procedures ',for reques-
ting of DOH through DHCF, for the issuance^ Of a 
declaratory order determining the applicability of a 
statute, rule, or order to specified circumstances^ w ^ r \ 
1
 A. DEFINITIONS For purposes of these provis-
ions: 
1. "Agency" means the Division of "Health Care 
Financing, Utah Department of.Healtlj. 
2. "Applicability* means a determination "of 
whether a statute, rule, or order should be applied, 
and if so, how the law as stated, should, be. applied to 
specific facts and circumstances, 
, 3. "Declaratory Ruling" means' an^administrative 
interpretation or explanation of rights," status, and or 
other legal relations under a. specific statute,' rule, or 
order. 
4. 'Order* means an agency, action pf particular 
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